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1INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of the century categorical syllogisms (see Appendix
1 ) have been used by psychologists as modus operand! for studying the
reasoning process. A well-structured task with no more than mood and
figure determining its logical validity, it becomes a useful tool,
easily amenable to empirical investigations.
That the solution of syllogisms involves a deductive reasoning pro-
cess is not a point worthy of debate. But both psychologists and philos-
ophers alike have arduously belabored whether or not the formal logical
rules of the syllogism are representative of the laws of thought.
The older view, as characterized by Boole ( 1854), is that the
logical rules give symbolic expression to the operations of the rnind.
On the other h^nd, Cohen and Nagel (1956) argue that the laws of logic
are irrelevant to the bulk of actual reasoning. The basis of this inter-
pretation stems largely from the existence of error. How can the maxims
of formal logic denote laws of reasoning when much of our reasoning is
not logical? Woodworth (1938, p. 807 ) states,"If the laws of logic were
dynamic laws of the thinking process, they could not be broken. Every-
one obeys the lav; of gravitation, but we all are likely to disobey the
laws of logic."
For the most part, investigators using syllogisms to study deductive
reasoning have not addressed themselves to the basic assumption of whether
human thinking is logical or nonlogical (perhaps not unreasonably so,
because of the complexity of the issue) . However, psychological investi-
gations into the variables that influence syllogistic error have been
varied and numerous. The earliest formulation (Woodworth and Sells, 1935)
2was the "atmosphere effect": that a set arises within the S to select
a response or judgment which is most similar in quality to the general
trend or tone of the whole situation. For example there is a greater
tendency for people to say incorrectly, "The group of boys were late",
rather than "The group of boys was late". Just as the plural noun sets
up an atmosphere effect of plurality, so Woodworth and Sells feel uni-
versal premises [All (a) or No (E) ] establish a set of "universality" to
select a universal conclusion as valid. Likewise, particular premises
[Some (i) or Some/not (o) ] set the stage for a particular conclusion to
be more readily accepted as valid. However, a combination of one uni-
versal and one particular premise establishes a preference for a particu-
lar conclusion. In a similar fashion the authors predict that an affirm-
ative premise (A or I) creates an affirmative atmosphere; a negative
premise, a negative atmosphere; but that the negative premise in combin-
ation with a positive one will over-ride the effects of the positive one.
In a later formulation hy Sells (1936) the principle of caution
was incorporated. Caution was defined as the tendency of Ss to accept
a weak conclusion (i or 0) over a stronger one (A or E) . Thus an AA
combination of premises sets up either an A or an I conclusion.
Chapman and Chapman (1959) restructured sources of syllogistic error
into two other classes: invalid conversion and probabilistic inference.
Invalid conversion occurs when the S erroneously assumes the converse of
a proposition is truo. In other words he misinterpretes All A are B
to mean that "All B are A", similarly that "Some X are not Y" to mean
"Some Y are not X." The error of probabilistic inference occurs when a
S judges the likelihood of a conclusion following from the premises rather
3than the certainty that it follow. The distinction is probably best
qualified by the following illustrations; a housewife with company coming
for dinner decides to liven up her menu by serving a new vegetable. Sur-
veying the frozen food case, she reasons:
Most Birds Eye frozen vegetables are good
products.
These packages of Chinese soybean sprouts are
Birds Eye frozen vegetables.
Therefore these packages of Chinese soybean
sprouts are good products.
In all likelihood the sprouts will be a good tasty product. However,
there is no certainty of this, and she would at best taste the product
before serving it to her guests. This may be the one line of Birds Eye
foods which is not good. If she could have assumed in the first premise
that aljl Birds Eye frozen vegetables are good, then her conclusion would
be valid. But as it stands, the argument is, logically speaking, invalid,
and the housewife has committed an error of probabilistic inference.
Wilkins ( 1928 ) and Frase (1966) have shown that errors also arise
from incorrect interpretations of the quantifier '’some". Unlike in every-
day usage where "some" implies "a few”, in formal logic the term is
defined as "at least one", and this could connote "a few"
,
"many" or "all",
but at least one. In another line of investigation Frase (1968) and
Pezzoii and Frase (1968) have shown that mediated associations play a
role in either interfering with or facilitating the deductive process.
While the content of the argument in no way influences its logical
validity, numerous investigators have found it does affect Ss' judgment of
that validity. Emotionally-toned syllogisms are more difficult to solve
(Lefford, 1946); arguments employing familiar qualifying terms are easier
than those with unfamiliar or symbolic ones (Wilkins, 1928 ); an
individual s
4re 3.iga.ous attitude may effect the solution of religiously- toned syllo-
gisms (Feather, 1964, 1967). Syllogistic reasoning may be distorted or
otherwise modified by personal convictions and belief systems (Janie and
Frick, 1943 ; Morgan and Morton, 1944; Thouless, 1959 ; Frase, I966.)
Perhaps a quote by Morgan and Morton ( 1944 , p. 59 ) test summarizes
the implications of these studies:
When an issue is embodied in a syllogism, the
respondent to such a syllogism believes that
he is selecting a conclusion based on logic,
whereas he is being influenced unwittingly by
his convictions, wishes, or fears.
More recently Ilenle (1962) has renewed the controversy as to the
more rational aspects of human thinking. She presents evidence that even
when errors do occur they are not necessarily indicative of deteriorated
and illogical reasoning; rather they result from the individual's mis-
understanding of the task or the materials presented to him. According
to Henle, errors are divisible into four categories: failure to accept
the logical task (as by probabilistic inference or judging the empirical
validity of the conclusion)
;
restatement of a proposition so that the
intended meaning is changed (e.g.
,
invalid conversion, using the non-
logical definition of the quantifier "some"); omission of a premise; or
incorporation of additional premises. The last two types of errors arise
primarily when the syllogisms are presented as everyday arguments, and
the S must extract the propositions from connected discourse.
While Henle' s research has suggested that errors be attributed to
extralogical sources, leaving a "pure" reasoning process which presumably
conforms to logical rules, the work of DeSoto, London and Handel ( 19°j)
and Huttenlocher (1968) on ordering syllogisms (e.g. All X
are bigger
5than Y, all Y are bigger than Z, therefore all X are bigger than Z)
provide additional hypotheses into the thought processes involved in
syllogistic reasoning. In the ordering syllogisms it was found that
Ss frequently adopt a strategy utilizing spatial images to represent the
order of items. The solver considers each of the qualifiers as material
items which can be conceptually located in space. Elements of the first
premise are spaced along an imaginary horizontal or vertical array. As
the third item is introduced by the minor premise, the S considers its
position in the array relative to the initial two elements. If he is
accurate in this placement, the validity of the conclusion becomes
readily apparent.
The use of spatial images or graphic supports (Euler diagrams) to
express the relationship between qualifiers in categorical syllogisms has
also been suggested by previous researchers (Woodworth, 1938) . In fact
only five Euler diagrams are needed to express the relationship between
items of a proposition, as seen from Table 1 . The proposition "All X
are Y" can be represented by examples (a) and (b) of this Table, since in
each of these Eulers the X set is completely enclosed by Y. The E pro-
position can only be expressed by diagram (e), since it is the only
instance where X is completely outside the boundaries of Y. "Some X are
Y"
,
the I proposition, can be interpreted in one of four ways (a, b, c,
d)
,
since in each of these representations at least one element in set X
is within the confines of Y. The 0 proposition, "Some X are not Y",
can be diagrammed as (c), (d) or (e), since at least one X is not enclosed
by Y.
The model of syllogistic reasoning supported by Henle proposes that
6TABLE 1
Euler Diagrams Expressing the Relationship Between Two Sets
(X and Y) and the Propositions They Describe
Verbal Description Euler Corresponding
Proposition
a. Sets X and Y coincide All X are Y
Some X are Y
b. Set X is included in Y All X are Y
Some X are Y
c. Set Y is included in X Some X are Y
Some X are not Y
d. Sets X and Y intersect Some X are Y
Some X are not Y
Some X are not Y
©©
e. Sets X and Y are mutu-
ally exclusive
No X are Y
7aberrations in judgment result from extralogicnl sources of error. Once
these sources are removed, there remains only a pure process of reasoning
which conforms to the laws of logic. However, we have seen at least with
relational syllogisms (Huttenlocher, 1968 ) that the strategics 5 s use in
deriving conclusions are also important. Performance is influenced by
the use of spatial imagery. As to categorical syllogisms, propositional
statements may also be interpreted by the use of spatial imagery, and
Henle and Michael (1956) have shown that training in the use of diagrams
drastically reduces the number of judgmental errors.
On the basis of the findings for relational syllogisms a new model of
syllogistic reasoning is proposed in which solution of the categorical
syllogism is viewed as a 2-stage problem-solving task. In the first stage
of analysis, the solver must establish the relationship between classes
of the qualifying terms in each premise. But unlike relational syllogisms
where one horizontal or vertical axis will suffice, in categorical
syllogisms more than one conceptualization must be considered. Consider
the following AAA syllogisms of the first figure:
Major premise All B are C.
Minor premise All A are B.
Conclusion All A are C.
When confronted with the major premise the reasoner must realize he
is faced with two interpretations: either all C are B, or equally
possible, some C are not B. Following the line of reasoning taken by
Woodworth (Table l)
,
these interpretations may be schematized by using
Euler diagrams:
Maj-j
All B are C, but
some C are not B.
All B are C, and
all C are B.
8In a similar fashion when confronted with the second premise (which
in this case is also an A proposition)
,
the S must conceptualize a simi-
lar duo-interpretation — specifically that all B are A, or that some B
are not A. See the following:
All A are B
,
and
all B are A.
But the problem is compounded by
Min
2
All A are B, but
some B are not A.
the fact that the relationships
established by the second premise must be formulated within the con-
straints established by the first premise. Thus considering just the first
interpretation of the major proposition (Maj^ and that of the minor pre-
mise (Min^) we would conceptualize the relationship among the three quali-
fiers as three coincident circles,
,
which suggests a valid con-
clusion since all A are in fact C.
Similarly, the only conceptualization for Maj^ - Min^ interpretation
would be the set of A included within B and C coincident circles:
Again, the conclusion "All A are C" holds.
Continuing this logic the Maj^ interpretation will yield two additional
alternatives. Under Min^, A and B coincident circles are included in C —
— and for Min^, C includes B which in turn includes all A —
. And again in both these latter conceptualizations, all A are
in fact C.
Since in every possible instance from our example we found that all
A were C, we would judge the argument valid. If, however, the conclusion
did not hold in orte of the instances, then the argument must be judged as
9invalid. Even if the conclusion held in the majority of caoes, the
negation by one instance necessitates the judgment of invalid. Given
this IAI first-figure syllogism,
Some Y are Z.
All X are Y.
Some X are Z.
we see from Table 2 that out of ten possible alternatives, only two of
these negate the conclusion that some X are Z. Yet these two are
sufficient to make the syllogism invalid.
Thus the model as presented is a two-fold problem-solving task.
First the individual must interpret the relationships among classes of
terms given in the premises. Secondly the solver must isolate at least
one instance where the conclusion does not follow from the premises.
That is, it is not sufficient for S to isolate where the conclusion does
follow. Jn any syllogicrn it is necessary to conclude invalidity if at
least one instance does not follow.
The Problem
With this two-stage analysis of syllogistic reasoning, what insights
into the process can be inferred?
Errors may result from the second stage of analysis if Ss do not
comprehend the task at hand, namely as a search for at least one instance
which negates the conclusion. Traditional instructions merely tell the S
to judge whether the conclusion can validly be drawn from the information
given in the preceding two premises. The S is not instructed how to re-
spond if most of the time the conclusion is valid. If an error results,
it could be categorized as Chapman and Chapman's probabilistic inference,
10
TABLE 2
Alternative Interpretations of an IAI Syllogism of the First
Figure Using Euler Diagrams
Major Premise: Some Y are Z
Maj
x
Maj
2
Maj^ Maj
4
Instance where the conclusion "Some X are Z" does not hold.
Therefore, this syllogistic argument is invalid.
11
or as Henle's Type 1, where the S fails to conform to the logical task
Within the framework of the proposed model, it should be viewed as an
error resulting from the omission or misunderstanding of the second stage
of analysis. The implication, then, is that training on the second stage
of analysis should more clearly delineate the logical task and thus lead
to more efficacious performance.
As for the jTirst^ stage of analysis — conceptual interpretations of
propositions — previous studies (Wilkins, 1928; Engelstein, 1967) have
given sufficient evidence to indicate that empirical biases lead to error
in syllogistic reasoning. However, it is the hypothesis of this study
that these errors should not be viewed as distortions of the reasoning
process, but rather a function of the S's failure to generate alternative
interpretations of the premises.
For example, given "All right angles (B) are 90° angles (c) as the
first premise of a syllogism, a S may more readily view this relationship
judgment. As seen from Table 3
,
the line of reasoning following from the
assumption that B and C are coincident circles leads to acceptance of the
conclusion that no A are C. Yet there are two possible instances where the
conclusion "No A are C" is invalid.
In contrast, empirical bias in some instances may actually benefit the
S. Suppose the first premise of the AEE syllogism above had read "All
as coincident sets
,
and omit the alternative interpretation
. This biased interpretation may lead to an incorrect validity
cows (B) are animals (c)". The interpretation now
where B is a subset of C. As seen from Table 3 this interpretation does
lead to the disclosure of instances negating the conclusion. As such the
TABLE 3
Alternative Interpretations of an AEE Syllogism of the First
Figure Using Euler Diagrams
12
Major Premise: All B are C
Maj
1
Instance where the conclusion "No A are C" does not hold.
Therefore, this syllogism is invalid.
13
S would probably correctly jud^e the argument invalid - assuming that he
comprehends that only one instance not supporting the argument is sufficient
grounds for rejecting its validity.
Thus empirical biases in and of themselves would not lead to syllogis-
tic errors. It is only with invalid syllogisms, when a restricted inter-
pretation blinds a S to instances negating the conclusion, that an error
in reasoning may occur.
In eurnmai y then, if the 2—stage analysis of syllogistic reasoning is
appropriate, then search biases should affect validity judgments of invalid
syllogisms, not by distorting the reasoning process, but by interfering
with S' s interpretations of premises. Such interference effects should be
attenuated by various training techniques, for example, the use of Euler
diagrams. Furthermore, training in line with the second stage of analysis,
which delineates the logical task as a search for at least one instance
that nullifies the conclusion, should also improve performance.
The studies that follow were designed to test the cogency of the 2-
etage model. By manipulating the empiricism of premises and conditions
of training, it should be possible to experimentally control and predict
error patterns in validity judgments. Before preceding with those studies,
it was necessary to investigate syllogistic performance in terns of two
additional factors which are peripheral to the model as proposed, yet may
interfere with the predictions of error patterns. These factors are the
quantifier "some", which we saw earlier interferes with performance when
the S fails to adopt its logical definition "at least one"; and verbiage —
the addition of verbally meaningful phrases prior to the quantifying term
of each premise. The investigation of these variables wfas undertaken in
14
the pilot study that follows. Moreover, the pilot study provided addi-
tional evidence that the strategy employed in attempting to solve the
syllogism influences performance
.
Pilot Study
Previous studies (Wilkins, 1928 ; Woodworth, 1938; Frase, 1966)
have shown that confusion arises over the logical definition of the term
"some”. Although conventionally the logical definition of the term is
explained by initial instructions, perhaps Ss forget the formal definition
while solving the problems. Thus errors evolving from the quantifier
"some" may be attributed to a memory factor. As such it would be desirable
to eliminate it as a source of error when testing the model under study.
To test whether the memory factor may be reduced, the pilot study presented
one group of Ss syllogisms with "some" substituted by the phrase "at least
one". No substitutions were made for the control group.
A second factor that has not received much attention in previous
studies is "verbiage". Pezzoli and Frase (1968) found weak support that
propositions preceded by verbally meaningful phrases (verbiage) led to a
reduction of syllogistic error, even though the extraneous phrases in no
way affect the logical validity of the argument. The reduction of errors
under high verbiage conditions found by Pezzoli and Frase may be an diti-
fact of memory. Since propositions were presented sequentially , the
basis
for judging the conclusion was contingent upon a S's recollection of the
preceding information given in the premises. High verbiage may
have in-
creased the meaningfulness of premises and, thus,
facilitated memory of
In this pilot study each syllogism was presented
as a whole,
the premises.
15
thuB eliminating the memory factor. If performance is not facilitated
then verbiage would no longer be of interect for the present model.
Eight valid and 12 invalid categorical syllogisms, varying in mood>
figure, and difliculty level and containing one or two propositions quan-
tified by "some" or "some/not", were selected and supplied with qualifiers
of low meaning! ul CVC's (Archer, i960). The same syllogisms were then
expanded for the verbiage condition by preceding each proposition by a
phrase of 10-12 words. For example, "Some YIN are JUB" was expanded to
"Any top-notch student of cryptography knows before studying his notes
that some YIN are JUB". Each of the 40 syllogisms (20 hi- and 20 no-
verbiage) were dittoed on separate 8|r by Jj- in. sheets and randomly collated
into test booklets t For the "at least one" condition this phrase was sub-
stituted for the quantifier "some" in the same 40 syllogisms as above, and
test booklets were randomized and collated in the same fashion.
Thirty-two Ss, recruited from two undergraduate educational psychology
laboratories, were seated in a typical classroom and randomly assigned to
either condition of quantifying terms. They were given corresponding writ-
ten instructions (see Appendix II): the "at least one" group was told that
this refers to a variety of quantities — a few, many and even all — but
at least one; the other condition was given the standard instructions de-
fining "some" as "at least one" and that contrary to everyday usage it could
mean a few, many and even all. Further instructions to both groups explained
(a) the nature of the syllogistic task, i.e. to judge whether the conclusion
can be drawn validly from the information given in the preceding two pre-
mises, and (b) how to record their validity judgments in the answer booklet.
16
The Sb were self-paced and allowed ample time (one hour) to complete the
task.
At the end of the task additional information was obtained. One of
the more interesting variables pertinent to the proposed problem-solving
model is the type of strategies Ss use in solving syllogisms. Eidens
(1928) examined strategies in interpreting propositions by having Ss in-
trospectively report on a series of singular propositions like the follow-
ing, "What do you know about P (or not P) when it is true that no (some
or all) S's are P," He found Ss resorted to spatial imagery not unlike
Euler diagrams. But, do Ss carry out such strategies in the syllogism
task? And, if strategies akin to the 2—stage model are spontaneously
adopted, do they lead to a significant reduction of errors?
In order to obtain some information on this problem, Ss were asked
after solving all problems to write a brief paragraph describing any
strategy they might have employed. The Ss' protocols were then grouped
according to the reasoning strategy employed. Of the 32 Ss, nine (subset-
strategy group) vievred relationships between qualifying terms in terms of
classes or subsets, similar to Euler diagrams. These Ss were easily identi-
fied from diagrams in answer booklets and from references to subsetting
strategies in the self-reports. The remaining 23 Ss were placed in the no-
strategy group, since their self-reports and scratch spaces in the answer
booklets revealed no other consistent mode of attack. Statements from this
latter group included cryptic reports like: I used ny own logic which I
can't explain, and the method of solution was — that sounds logical, to
more concrete explanations of dubious help: copying the propositions in
longhand, replacing nonsense syllables with letters or concrete objects.
17
This latter Btratefflr may have helped or hindered performance, depending
upon the empirical biases created in the statements; but most of the few
Ss who did try this approach claimed it extinguished after a few problems
since it led to confusion.
A 2( strategy) x 2(quantifier) x 2(verbiage) factorial design with re-
peated measures on the last factor was used to analyze the results. The
dependent measure was the number of errors in validity judgments. Thus
for invalid arguments
,
a judgment of valid was considered an error and for
valid syllogisms, an invalid judgment was erroneous.^
A Hartley test (i960) indicated there were no grounds for rejecting
the assumption of homogeneity of variance. An analysis of variance using
the method of expected cell frequency for unequal and disproportionate cell
means revealed that the only significant factor was Strategy, p (l,28) =
19.07, j> < .001c Mean number of errors for the no- and subset-strategy
groups were, respectively, 15.00 and 8.44,
Clearly then, those Ss who resorted to some unclearly-defined, internal
paralogic performed significantly less well than those who spontaneously
externalized the relationships between qualifiers in terms of sets or sub-
sets — the first stage of the problem-solving model. Interestingly enough,
the one S in the sample who had previously studied formal logic claimed in
the self-report that she found the laws of logic too burdensome to remem-
ber and so resorted to Euler diagrams.
This paper has developed a model of syllogistic reasoning which
conceptualizes the process as consisting of two stages: the interpretation
of propositions and the search for at least one negative instance of the
The pilot study has suggested that strategies which conceptualizeconclusion.
18
elements of a proposition in terms of Euler-like diagrams would benefit
performance on syllogistic reasoning. The question remains, what are
the necessary instructional conditions to get Ss to use the appropriate
strategies, and secondly, if verbally meaningful words instead of CVC's
are used for qualifying terms, then what is the effect of empirical bias
on the utilization of such strategies? The first study has provided in-
formation on these questions, essentially questions about the first stage
of the model. Since Ss' interpretations of propositions were indeed in-
fluenced by various search biases, a second study was designed to explore
whether Ss can be trained to ignore such biases in the syllogistic task.
19
STUDY I
When Ss are asked to interpret singular propositions (not the whole
syllogism) in terms of Euler diagrams, do they produce all or most alter-
native interpretations, and if not, what conditions might facilitate such
production? In an attempt to arrive at some answers to these questions,
Ss were required to use Euler diagrams to interpret singular propositions;
that is, they were required to draw spatially the logical relationship ex-
pressed by each proposition. One group of Ss was introduced to one
arrangement —that which describes the E proposition — as an example and
to insure that Ss comprehended the requirement of producing Euler diagrams.
When presented with A, I, and 0 propositions, they were required to generate
the remaining four arrangements when appropriate. A second group was given
the same information, but in addition was exposed to the four diagrams which
do not correspond to the E proposition. Thus half the Ss were required to
produce the various diagrams under appropriate situations, whereas the
remaining half were required to select those diagrams which were appropriate
for each proposition. The purpose of including these two conditions was
to test whether exposure to all arrangements would facilitate performance
on A, I, and 0 propositions, since by eliminating the need to generate
arrangements, the task was reduced to a matching problem where Ss must
merely recognise which diagrams were appropriate to the proposition at hand.
A second factor of primary interest in this study was the effect of
empiricism on the interpretations of propositions. Three categories of
empiricism were employed: empirically true, empirically false, and
empiric al ly n eutral
.
20
In the empirically true (ET) conditions, verbal qualifiers were used
to establish statements congruent with reality, e.g. "All girls (c) are
humans (H)". But in reality the set of girls is a subset of humans;
and if empiricism restricts Ss' interpretations as predicted, then Ss
would be expected to draw only the Euler diagram
,
where girls are
a subset of humans. Similarly it is anticipated that in the proposition
All right angles (R) are 90 angles (A)" interpretations will be restricted
to (k/R)
,
since in reality right angles and 90° angles are identical.
However, for each of these two statements, both diagrams — not just the
empirically biased one — should be produced if a S responds to the logical
components of the task.
Under empirically false (EF) conditions, verbal qualifiers were used
to establish statements not congruent with reality, e.g. "All girls (g)
are tables (T)". Realistically speaking, no girls are tables. But in
responding to the logical components of the task, a S should ignore the
empiricism and respond to both interpretations of any A proposition, i.e.
(g)T) and • This EF category was included to assess level
of responding where there was no experimentally manipulated empirical bias,
yet the meaningfulness of individual words was comparable to that of the
ET condition. The EF category was included for an additional reason. Some
Ss may more readily adopt the strategy of completely disregarding the
empirical meaning of the propositions, if these incongruent propositions
are presented first. That is, in the proposition "All girls are tables"
it is clear that the empiricism is not congruent with reality; so a S
may eliminate empirical referents as a possible basis for interpreting
the statement. Such a set, if induced early in the experiment, may
trans-
fer to ET statements and thus raise the level of
performance.
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finally, additional propositions were composed in which nonsense
words or syllables were used as qualifiers. This type of statement, called
the empirically neutral condition (Eli), would thus serve as a control to
assess response biases in the interpretation of propositions, uninfluenced
by empirical biases or the inclusion of meaningful qualifiers.
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METHOD
Subjects
Ninety Ss were recruited from undergraduate introductory psychology
courses at the University of Massachusetts. Subjects failing to use two
sets, one to correspond to each qualitative term, were eliminated, N = 6.
Independent Variables
Training. Two training conditions were established as a between
variable. The Ss given least information (T-^ were instructed in the use
of Euler diagrams by explanation of the correct Euler interpretation for
the E proposition, "No A are B". A second group (T
2 ) ,
was additionally
presented the other four Euler diagrams and was informed of the inappropriate-
ness of these for the E proposition. In this way, Ss in group T
2
were
provided all possible Euler diagrams and only needed to apply them to the
other types of propositions. (Appendix III contains a sample instruction
sheet for T
2
« The information included within brackets, which describes
the other four Euler diagrams, was omitted for group T^.)
Empiricism . Substituting letters, nonsense words or meaningful words
for the qualifiers of propositions in no way alters the logical validity
of the argument, just as such substitutions should in no way alter the
reasoner's interpretations of propositions, even if the statements are no
longer empirically true. The effect of such substitutions were investiga-
ted by composing propositions under three categories of empiricism.
(Appendix IV catalogues items for each category.)
For empirically true (ET) items, the qualifiers were meaningful words
which established statements judged by most naive Ss (Pezzoli, 1969) to
correspond to specific Euler diagrams. For each type of proposition,
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different levels of ET were composed, one corresponding to each of the
possible interpretations of that proposition. As explained in Table 1
,
multiple interpretations are characteristic of A, I, and 0 propositions.
When confronted with an A proposition, a S must consider two interpretations
coincident sets
,
and the subset where the subject of the sen-
tence is included within the predicate
^?) . As a consequence, two
levels of empirically biased A propositions were composed. One implied
coincident sets, e.g. "All right angles are 90° angles"; and the other
implied the subject of the sentence was a subset of the predicate, e.g.
"All girls are humans". The former is denoted ET^ and the latter ET
2
for the A proposition. There were three examples at each of these two
levels of ET, totaling six A propositions.
Since there are four possible interpretations for the I proposition,
four sets of statements (ET^ - ET^ for the I proposition) were composed,
each level corresponding to one of the four possible interpretations.
Three examples were composed for each level
,
bringing the total I pro-
positions to 12. Similarly for the 0 proposition, three sets of three
examples each were composed, totaling nine propositions quantified by
"come/not". Fur the E proposition only one example was composed. Since
this proposition has only one interpretation and Ss were initially trained
on it, there was little further interest in this proposition. In summary,
the ET category consisted of nine sets of items, where each set corresponded
to different interpretations of particular types of propositions and
three examples were composed for each set. These propositions plus the
one E proposition brought the total number of items in this category to 28.
For the empirically false category (EF) , meaningful words were used
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as qualifiers to express statements known from common knowledge to be
senseless, e.g. "All typewriters are crocodiles". Because it is mean-
ingless to talk about levels of empirical bias for each proposition when
using EF statements, only three examples were composed for each type of
proposition, except for the E proposition where only one example was
included. Thus the total number of EP items was 10.
Empirically neutral (EN) statements contained qualifiers filled by
nonsense syllables (Archer, i960 ) and paralogs (Noble, 1952), e.g. "All
neglans are balaps". A total of 48 such statements were composed al-
though 5s receiving ET and EP statements were presented only 10 such
propositions — three A, one E, three I, and three 0 propositions. (See
Order variable below.)
Order . Each training group was partitioned into three subgroups
where sequence of empirical categories was varied. Table 4 summarizes
these sequences.
0^ — Subjects were presented the 28 ET statements, then the 10 EP
statements followed by the terminal block of 10 EN items. Total exposure
was to 48 items.
0^ — The order of presenting ET and EF items was
juxtaposed. Initial
exposure was to the EP category, then ET category, and finally the terminal
block of EN items.
0^ — These groups,
like 0^ and received a total of 48
items, but
all items were empirically neutral. The first block included 10 items and
contained the same breakdown for types of propositions as that describee
for the EE category, i.e. three A, one E, three I, and three 0
propositions.
The next 18 items contained the residual examples necessary
to make
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TABLE 4
Composition of Order Groups Over Blocks of Trials
Order
Group
Trial Block
B, B, B- B'1 2 "3 ^4
(Trials 1-10) (Trials 11-18) (Trials 19-38) (Trials 39-48)
ET ET EF EN
0
,
EP ET ET EN
EN EN EN EN
ET = Empirically True
EP = Empirically False
EN = Empirically Neutral
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comparisons to the 28 ET propositions. In other words, there were three
A, no E, nine I, and six 0 propositions, which if combined with the first
10 EN examples would constitute 28 items with the same breakdown as that
described for the ET category. The final two blocks each contained 10
items with a 3-1-3-3 breakdown. As such the first block of EN items could
be compared with the EF statements of 0
2
where the EP category was pre-
sented first, or they could be combined with the residual items to make
comparisons with the ET items of 0^. Since all groups received practice
on the same number of items, the terminal EN series from each of the three
groups could be contrasted to test order effects and the influence of ET
and EP statements on EN performance.
Mode. Consider the statement "All neglans are balaps". By the very
nature of the proposition, the experimenter is in fact presenting two
stimuli, or two levels of moaning. The class of neglans should be con-
sidered the same as the class of balaps ( (mAT) ) as well as a subset of
balaps ( )*
—
may or may n°b ^bend to both interpretations,
nevertheless the potential modes exist and must be considered by the S in
order to solve syllogisms correctly, as we saw in Table 3.
Thus any A proposition, regardless of its empiricism, always has two
modes although they have been arbitrarily designated as: = mutually
inclusive sets; = the first term as a subset of the other. Y/hen con-
sidering an ET statement, its mode should not be confused with its
empirical bias. Thus an ET^ "all" statement such as "All cars are auto-
do, in fact restrict S's interpretations. But both modes exist. Likewise
for an ETg statement, such as "All trees are plants", M2 is
more readily
mobiles" may more empirical biases
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apparent, yet is also a potential interpretation. A S who is responding
correctly would disregard the empiricism of these statements, attend to
both modes, then respond "by diagramming (x/v) and for each
statement. Again the use of meaningful qualifiers has no effect on the
logical requirements of the task.
In a similar fashion, any E proposition has only one mode, since
there is only one interpretation. An I proposition will have four modes,
and three will he found for an 0 proposition.
dependent Variable
The dependent measure was the number of Euler diagrams drawn by S
to the different modes for each level of empiricism. Consider ET^ "all"
propositions whore the empiricism of each of the three examples is biased
towards the adoption of coincident sets. A S responding correctly would
three times, once forignore the bias and produce (g) and ((*- )Y'
each of the three examples. He would thus receive a score of 3 under
(which has been designated the mode of coincident sets) and 3 under
(the mode where X is a subset of Y). .However, a S whose responding is
completely determined by the empirical bias would only draw for
each statement. His score under would again be 3, but for it would
be zero. When confronted by the ET^ "all" statements, which connote X as
a subset of Y, the S who is letting the empirical bias restrict his inter-
pretation will only draw for each of the three statements, thus
receiving zero under and 3 for M^.
Note that when empiricism does restrict Ss, as in the last two cases
above, maximum scores fall under the mode corresponding to that inter-
pretation suggested by the empirical bias. The score for M1 is
greatest
28
Kith ET
X
propositions; for Mg, with ETg propositions. Scores are predicted
to he minimal under the modes not corresponding to the empirically biased
interpretation, e.g.
,
(x/y) drawings should occur less frequently under
On the other hand, if empirical biases do not blind Ss to al-
ternative interpretations, then the frequency of responding should be
comparable for all modes for a particular type of proposition.
Test Materials
In order to insure standardized notation for the diagrams across all
Ss, each qualifying term was followed by its initial letter in parentheses,
e.g. "Seme houses (H) are not trees (t)". Each proposition was dittoed on
8|- x 3|' in. sheets, which al]ov;ed ample scratch space for diagramming.
All sheets were randomized for each S within categories of empiricism.
Thus E'T statements were randomized across all levels of ET. A restriction
on the randomized order was that no three propositions of the same type
(A, E, I, 0) occurred in sequence, and in addition for the ET category,
no more than two examples of any particular level were permitted to occur
sequentially.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly scheduled to report to one of six experimental
sessions. Each session was delegated to one of the six Training x Order
conditions. Upon arrival to the testing room, each S was asked to take
a seat and then handed an instruction sheet and a test booklet appropriate
to the group. No further instructions were given except to tell S
to
take as much time as he needed, and that when the task was
completed, to
return the test booklet and instructions to the proctor.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Anal.y ses of EN and EF Statements
^idence of response biases. In support of the major hypothesis of
this study
,
it was found that Ss do display difficulty in interpreting
propositions in all possible ways. However, this difficulty emanates not
only from the empirical biases of sentences as originally predicted, but
also from response biases which Ss bring into the experiment. In other
words, even when neutral qualifiers were used, there was a clear pattern
of preference in the manner of diagramming each proposition.
Under the 0
-^
condition, where Ss received only EN statements through-
out the experiment, the clearest estimate of initial response biases
uncontaminated by the inclusion of empirically biased sentences may be
estimated. Preliminary analyses of variance were carried out on 0
^
Ss
using performance scores from Blocks 1
,
3
,
and 4 to determine if training
and practice had any effect on the frequency of responding to each mode.
Since there was no Training main effect in the analyses (see Appendix V),
the results that are presented for 0
^
Ss are pooled over Training groups.
As seen from Table which summarizes the mean frequency of response
to each mode for the 0^ group, greater responding was to i n
the A proposition than to the alternative interpretation M . (^/T^)
Analysis of variance failed to show this difference to be significant.
On the other hand, in the I proposition mean frequency of response was
greatest for M^, the mode of intersecting sets , practically
non-existant to (^D^) » while responses to M2 and fell between
the two extremes. Analysis of variance revealed these differences to be
significant, P (3,84) 26.760, 2 < •O01 * Each Pair of ordered means
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cedure.
Response biases were also found with the 0 proposition. Again it
was found that response to the mode of intersecting sets,
,
was greatest
and the Newman-Kuels procedure showed differences between all ordered
pairs to be reliable* Thus, for both the 1 and 0 propositions, it was
found that in the absence of experimentally manipulated empirical biases,
Ss nevertheless showed marked preferences for certain interpretations to
the exclusion of others.
Comparison of the first, middle, and terminal blocks of EN proposi-
tions indicated that for two types of propositions, the frequency of
response, irrespective of mode, did increase over trials (i proposition:
Z ( 2 »56) = 14*948, £ < .001 ; 0 proposition: F ( 2 , 56 ) = 5 . 369 , £ < .01).
Mean frequencies to the I proposition for each block were: B-^ = 0.93,
= 1.16, = 1 . 24 ; for the 0 proposition these frequencies were:
B^ = 1.30, = 1.49, B^ = I. 46 . However, no significant Mode x Blocks
interactions were found for any of the propositions. This would indicate
the response preferences were neither attenuated nor enhanced significantly
by practice over trials.
Further evidence that these initial biases were not sv\bject to mod-
ification by extended practice comes from an analyst s performed on the
terminal block of EN statements from all three Order groups (see Appendix
while response to M^, the subsetted interpretation
,
was minimal.
These differences vwere also found significant, F ( 2 , 56 ) = 29 . 903
, £ < .001,
VI for AN0VA tables). Examination of Table 5 shows that, when pooled
over the three Order groups, the mean response frequencies to each mode
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displayed a pattern of preference similar to that described above.
Specifically,
greater to M9V
for the A proposition
^3^ )
,
than to M
response
i* @)
frequencies were significantly
»
(P ( 1 , 84 ) = 5 . 78
, ^ < . 025).
In the I and 0 propositions there was a strong preference to attend to M
,
intersecting sets, and to neglect the subsetted mode
f
ang
-t^e
coincident mode (s/P) U proposition: F (3,252) = 57 - 443
, £ < .001;
0 proposition: F (2,168) = 50 . 676
, £ < .001).
Of greater interest here is the finding that these preference patterns
in terminal EN statements were not significantly influenced by specific
Order conditions. The pattern found for 0^, after practice on 38 pre-
ceding EN items, was very similar to that for 0-^ and 0^, where terminal
EN statements followed 38 trials on ET and EP propositions. The analyses
failed to uncover any significant Mode x Order interactions for any of
the types of propositions. Thus it appears that these response biases,
given neutral statements, are not easily modified. Patterns emitted on
the terminal block of EN trials were no different after 48 practice trials
than those emitted on the first block of EN trials; nor were these terminal
patterns different from those which were emitted after practice on more
meaningful material. These initial preferences for attending to specific
modes to the exclusion of others persevere throughout lengthy practice,
whether that practice is on similar statements using nonsense terms or on
more meaningful material which reflects empirical biases.
To see if similar response biases would enter into the interpreta-
tions of EP statements, another series of comparisons was made and in
general it was found that such response biases were not specific to
non-
sense EN conditions, but were a characteristic of EP statements
as well
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Specifically, analyses (see Appendix VII for EP analyses) comparing the
first ten items of C>
2
(EF propositions) with the first ten statements of
O
3 (
FjN Propositions), although revealing no Mode main effect for the A
propositions, did indicate significant response differences in the I and
0 propositions (i proposition: F (3,168) = 40 . 751
, £ <. 001; 0 proposition:
P (2,112) = 35»729
» £ *C .001). As seen from Table 5t these means portrayed
the same response patterns described for the EN items; and furthermore,
these patterns were not significantly differentiated by Order groups; that
is, the Mode x Order interaction failed to be reliable. There remained
a propensity to interpret the Particular propositions (i and 0) as inter-
secting sets and to exclude almost entirely the subset
,
and the
coincident set interpretation for the I proposition.
Training
. Although originally anticipated that the greater training
condition (T^) would lead to a higher frequency of response than the less
informative condition (T^)
,
the results showed the main effect of Training
to be significant in only one analysis on non-empirically biased material.
In this instance, the results were contrary to expectation. The signifi-
cant effect was the 0 proposition on the terminal blocks of EN trials.
Means for T-^ and T^ were, respectively, I .64 and 1.37 (F ( 1
,
84 ) = 4*362,
£ <.05).
Investigations of the interaction of training with mode, however,
may shed some additional light on the effect of introducing the various
Euler diagrams. Two T x M interactions were found significant: the 0
proposition from group 0-^, F (2,56 ) = 3 • 243 « £ < *05» an(^ ^he ^ proposition
from the analysis on terminal EN items, F ( 1 , 84 ) = 4- 953 , £ < *05. The
means from these two analyses are summarized in Table 6 . Under T2 condi-
tions, the response biases described above were modified. T2 Ss responded
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TABLE 6
Depolarization Effect
Mean Frequency of Responding for Each Significant Training x Mode
Interaction on Non-Empirically Biased Items
Analysis Training
0 Proposition
0^ Practice T^
A Proposition
Terminal EN
Mode
M
x
M
2
M-j
(2© ©0 (gs)
2.82 1.80 .06
1.87 1.44 .47
1.07 2.24
1.62 1.66
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more frequently to the previously iG„ored mode than did the T SSi but
less frequently to the preferred modes. It appears that introducing
Ss to all arrangements of Euler diagrams does expand the number of alter-
native interpretations attended to under certain conditions, hut only at
the expense of reducing attention to the dominant mode.
Considering the large number of analyses undertaken on the training
factor, and the paucity of significant results, it may he stated that the
overriding effect of training on non-einpirically biased items was negligible.
The little evidence in support of a training effect adds a dimension to
the original expectation. The more informative training condition did in-
crease attention to alternative inodes — those which were ignored by the
response biases but it diverted attention from the previously preferred
modes, despite the fact Ss were warned of the possibility of there being
more than one appropriate Euler diagram and encouraged to draw all such
instances when appropriate. While the evidence is as yet meager, this
tendency towards depolarization of response biases was not an infrequent
phenomena under other treatment conditions, as later results will attest
to.
In summary
,
the analyses on non-empirically biased items led to the
disclosure of strong response biases whose prevalence and perseverance
was unanticipated at the onset of experimentation. These initial sets
to attend to certain modes to the exclusion of others, while not criti-
cally altered by practice on similar non-meaningful material, were depolar-
ized by informing Ss of all possible alternative Euler diagram arrangements.
The section that follows discusses the effects of empirically biased
material on the modification of these initial response tendencies.
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Analyses of ET Items
Biases. Any A, I, or 0 proposition can be said to provide
more than one stimulus to the S in the sense that several different inter-
pretations for each proposition are possible and the S may or may not
attend to one or more of these interpretations (or what has been defined
in this study as modes). Indeed, the results cited above showed that Ss
attended to some interpretations, or modes, to the exclusion of others
when presented with non-empirically biased propositions. It was hypothe-
sized, however, that empirically biased statements would also be effective
in restricting Ss' attention to a particular mode. That is, under an
empirically biased condition, a mode (e.g., M-^) would be attended to more
frequently when it corresponded to the empirical bias (e.g., ET-^) than
under neutral (EN) conditions where there were no empirical biases. It
may be further expected that with the other empirical biases (e.g., ET^,
ET^, ET'
n )
response to that mode (M^) would be no higher than the control,
and indeed may be lower, if empirical biases served to draw attention away
from alternative interpretations. To determine the degree to which these
hypotheses were supported, analyses of variance (Appendix VIII ) were
carried out comparing performance on the ET statements of 0-^ (where em-
pirically biased items were presented first) and the first 28 items of 0-^.
Figure 1 plots the means for 0^ and 0^ for each Exll level. The 0 x E x M
interaction was significant in all three types of propositions (A proposi-
tion: F (1,56) = 17.891, £ <.001; I proposition: F (9,504) = 10.945,
£ < .001; 0 proposition: F (4,224) = 13.355, £ <
*001). Examination
of Figure 1 reveals the nature of these 3-way interactions. When ET
corresponded to a particular mode, 0X
performance was enhanced for that
MEAN
FREQUENCY
MEAN
FREQUENCY
MEAN
FREQUENCY
.5 -
o o
Group
Group
°1
°3
ET
1 et
2*~ EI^EV
M
1 m2
A PROPOSITION
M
1 M2 M 3
I PROPOSITION
Fig f 1. Mean frequency of response to a mode at all levels 01
empiricism for groups 0^ and 0^ in the A, I, and 0
propositions.
Note.—Curve for 0
3
should he flat singe levels of ET are only
arbitrary assignments.
^Differences between 0-, and 0-. groups at a particular level of
ET are significant, < .0^ (Newman-Kuels procedure).
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n.ode relative to performance for the control group (0^). These increases
were found to he significant (jd <
.05, Newrnan-Kuele procedure) except at
M
1
for each of the three types of propositions. But even at the order
was in the expected direction in 2 out of the 3 cases, the exception be-
ing for the I proposition. Furthermore, there were only a few instances
when performance was higher for group 0^ when empirical bias was at
variance with the mode under consideration. Several of these instances
were on the I proposition. Response to on all non-corresponding ETs
increased relative to the controls, although only the increment at ET^ was
significant . Furthermore, on the 0 proposition there was a slight incre-
ment in group 0^ productions to relative to the control when an ET-^
bias was introduced, although the difference here did not approach statis-
tical significance.^ Indeed the far more frequent occurrence on non-
corresponding ETs was a decrement in responding to the variant mode by
the experimental group, although these differences were significant in
only six of the cases in point.
In brief then, these results are taken in support of an empirical
bias effect. The empiricism of a statement tended to increase the saliency
of a mode; that is, relative to the control EN conditions, a mode was more
frequently attended to when the empiricism corresponded to it. But when
the empiricism did not correspond, response to that mode was no higher,
and indeed in most cases lower, than the controls.
At the outset of the experiment, it was questioned whether empirical
biases would be strong enough to '’blind" Ss to all alternative interpreta-
tions of a proposition, such that Ss would respond to only that
mode which
corresponded to the empirical bias, and ignore the others. To
make this
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appraisal, Table 7 has summarized the E x M interaction for the C>
1
group
by arranging mean frequency of response to all modes at a particular level
of ET. The underlined scores are those where the mode corresponds to the
empirical bias. If empirical biases truly "blind" Ss, then the underlined
score for a particular level of ET would be the only mode appreciably
attended to (e.g. close to 3, the maximum score). Response strength to
it would be highest in the row, and response to the other modes in that
row would be minimal.
As seen from Table 7 the dominant mode is; generally the underlined
score, arid the exceptions are where the empirical bias had to counteract
strong response biases. For example, in the I and 0 propositions the
highly preferred mode (M-^) was never really eliminated as a viable alter-
native, although attention was displaced to the empirically biased mode.
But in all three types of propositions, empirical biases were capable of
diverting attention from one mode to another. YJhile they did not serve
to blind Ss to all alternative interpretations, they did effectively counter-
act initial response tendencies except where these were strong. In light
of this, we must reject the initial hypothesis of "blinding" to a more
conservative hypothesis of "altering the response biases".
Training . The original expectation was that the group provided more
information about alternative Euler representations (T^) would achieve a
higher level of responding than the less informed group (T-^) . Most of the
results involving the training factor failed to reach statistical reliability.
However, one effect found uniformly significant across all three types of
propositions was a T x M interaction. The data relevant to this interaction
is summarized in Table 8 and suggests a depolarization effect not
unlike
TABLE 7
Empiricism x Mode Cell Means for Group 0
^
on Each Type of Proposition
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Type of
Proposition
Level of Mode
ET m
i M2 M4
A Proposition ET
1
1.83 1.27
et
2 .67 2.50
I Proposition ET
]
2.20
.37 .83
.93
et
2
1.63
.90 .37
ET. 1.87 .50 I .90 .43
et
4
1.97 .43 .60 1.73
0 Proposition ET
X
2.^0 1.27 .30
et
2 1.43 2 . 27 .27
et
3
2.03 1.27 1.03
Note. — Underlined cell is that mode which corresponds to the
empirical bias.
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TABLE 8
Mean Frequency of Response to Each Mode x Training Cell
for Croups 0^ and 0^
Type of
Proposition
Training
Group
*1
Mode
*2 M3 M4
A Proposition T
i 1.00 2.26
T
2 1.70 1.47
I Proposition T
1 2.53 .61 1.03 .48
T
2
1.68 .64 1.19 .60
0 Proposition T
1
2.53 1.60 .33
T
2
1.68 I .69 .44
42
that described for the EN propositions; that is under the T
2
condition the
response-biased favorite (s) was less frequently attended to, while re-
sponding to the alternative mode(s) increased. This effect is most
apparent in the A proposition, where Tg Ss responded less frequently to
the preferred mode (H^) than did the T^ Ss; but to the alternative mode
(Ml)» they responded more frequently than did T1 Ss. In the I and 0
propositions, the depolarization effect was less prevalent, the drop in
responding to the response-biased favorite under T
2
conditions being the
only alteration of appreciable magnitude. In all three types of proposi-
tions, the analyses of variance indicated that these T x M interactions
were significant (A proposition: P ( 1 , 56 ) = 9-722, £<.009; I proposition:
P (3,168) zz 3 . 889
, £ < .029; 0 proposition: P (2,112) = 4 .O69 , £<. 029 ).
Clearly one effect that may have been anticipated did not materialize:
additional information did not result in an overall increase in the level
of responding. Rather a depolarization of extreme responding was apparent,
particularly to the response-biased favorite.
Comparison between 0^ and 0 2 « This study was also designed to test
whether preceding practice on EP items would alter the response to ET
statements. Specifically, performance of 0^ Ss, who were initially ex-
posed to ET items, was characterised by E 1 K interactions where responding
to particular modes v.Tas selectively modified by empirical biases. The
question was whether performance of 0 2 Ss, who received
practice on EP
items before exposure to these ET items, would display a different pattern
of responding. V/hen confronted with the EP items, Ss may learn to dis-
regard the empiricism and respond on the basis of the logical components
of the task, and generalize this strategy to the ET propositions
that
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follow. As such, responding on ET items would not be tied to specific
empirical biases for this 0
2
group, as v/as indeed found for group Oy
To test whether this E x M interaction was differentiated by prior prac-
tice conditions, analyses were computed on ET items from and 0 r
However, the analyses failed to uncover a significant 0 x E x M inter-
action in any of the types of propositions. In fact, none of the main
effecis or interactions involving the Order factor were significant in
any of the types of propositions, except a 0 x T x E interaction in the
A proposition. In light of the fact that out of 26 comparisons involving
the Order effect between groups and 0
^
only one was significant (see
Appendix IX)
,
the results can hardly lend credence to an Order effect:
strategies to ignore the empirical components of the task on ET items could
not be induced with any degree of reliability by granting Ss prior ex-
posure to empirically meaningless items.
The first study was undertaken to investigate those factors related
to the first stage of the model the interpretation of propositions.
It has been found that even before Ss enter into the deductive task,
problems arise because they restrict their attention to only certain in-
terpretations of a proposition. Under neutral conditions where no
empirical biases were incorporated into the meaning of a proposition, Ss
clearly showed preferences in attending to certain modes to the exclusion
of others. furthermore
,
these preferences were resistant to practice on
similarly neutral propositions as well as empirically biased items. More
informative instructions only served to depolarize the extreme level of
performance. Even the incorporation of empirical biases did not obliterate
them; but of greater consequence it v/as found that the saliency of those
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modes corresponding to the empirical bias was critically increased. Far
greater attention was allotted to the empirically biased mode while atten-
tion to non-corresponding interpretations was thwarted. Hence, relative
to non-meaningful material, empirical biases were found to further encum-
ber the interpretations of propositions. The second study was undertaken
to test whether these restricted interpretations of propositions would
lead to errors in syllogistic reasoning, and secondly whether Ss could be
trained to ignore such biases in the syllogistic task.
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STUDY II
To the extent that empirical biases do restrict Ss' interpretations
of propositions, then it should be possible to control and predict error
patterns in syllogistic reasoning. As explained by Table 3 of the intro-
duction, if the major premise of an invalid syllogism is biased so that
the S only attends to one interpretation, he will judge the argument
valid — if the line of reasoning following from that singular interpre-
tation fails to disclose an instance nullifying the conclusion.
This study asked Ss to judge the validity of invalid syllogisms whose
first premises could be empirically biased to lead to either valid or
invalid conclusions. As a control the same syllogisms were also composed
with nonsense syllables as qualifiers of the first premise. While inter-
pretations of these propositions would not be subjected to empirical biases,
they would be influenced by initial response tendencies. It was hypothe-
sized that if the empiricism of propositions was capable of redirecting
N
attention from the initial response biases as was found in Study I, then
relative to the control syllogisms errors in reasoning would be greater
on those arguments where empirically biased interpretations led to a valid
conclusion, and that the lowest error rate would be associated with those
syllogisms alternatively biased to lead to an invalid conclusion.
Assuming that empirical biases create problems in judging the validity
of arguments (as well as the initial response biases the subjects bring to
the syllogistic task) , then the question remains whether Ss can
be trained
to ignore these deterrent factors and describe all possible
interpretations
of a statement. Training to do so would serve to minimize
errors emanating
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from the first stage of the proposed model — that of interpreting proposi-
tions. In addition, the question remains whether training on the second
stage, i.e., the search for at least one negative instance of the con-
clusion, would also reduce errors. If so, it could be predicted that
overall performance would be lowest in a control group which receives only
the standard instructions to judge whether or not a syllogism is valid,
and that overall performance would progressively increase as groups were
given more training under conditions prescribed by the model.
One other factor was under investigation in this study. Performance
over blocks of trials was analyzed to estimate the effects of practice,
and specifically whether the anticipated empirical bias effect would assume
a different character over blocks of trials.
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METHOD
Subjects
Seventy-eight Ss were recruited from two undergraduate educational
psychology discussion sections.
Independent Variables
Empiricism (E) . Nine invalid syllogisms varying in figure, mood,
and difficulty were selected for this study. Each argument contained at
least one line of reasoning following from the first premise which led to
a valid conclusion, even though alternative interpretations of that pre-
mise would disclose the argument's invalidity. Empirically biased state-
ments from Study I were used in the first premise of these nine syllogisms,
such that under E^ conditions the empirically biased interpretation led
to the disclosure of the argument's invalidity. For E^ conditions, the
same nine invalid syllogisms were fitted with first premises whose em-
pirically biased interpretations led to valid conclusions. Finally for
E
r,
conditions, the nine syllogisms were composed with nonsense words and
v
syllables for qualifying terms.
Training (T) . Six groups were established, each receiving different
amounts of information about the nature of the syllogistic task, Euler
diagrams, and the interpretation of propositions:
A control group (C-^) received the traditional instructions (see
Appendix II) . The syllogistic task was simply defined as a judgment re-
garding whether or not the conclusion validly follows from the information
given in the preceding two premises. No reference was made to Euler dia-
grams, empirical biases, or interpreting propositions.
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A second group (C
2 )
was composed in order to assess the effect of
specifically instructing Ss to seek alternative interpretations to each
proposition. The instructions (see Appendix X) were standard except for in-
troduction to the following basic material: a quantifier such as "no"
was explained as a word which quantifies the relationship between terms
of a proposition; then using the example of an "all" proposition, it was
further explained that other quantifiers would be employed which leave
room for more than one interpretation of a proposition. In such a case
one should consider all interpretations when judging the validity of the
argument
.
Unlike in where the quantitative relationship between terms was
merely explained to a S, in group TQ0 it was suggested that this quanti-
fication be conceptualized through the use of Euler diagrams. All five
diagrams which describe the relationship between two sets of elements
were introduced and the appropriate ones applied to a "no" and finally to
an "all" proposition, in the latter case to show how a statement may be
abject to more than one interpretation. Further instructions, as seen
from Appendix XI, paralleled those of Cg.
Group received the same instructions as TQq, addended by a
warn-
ing against empirical biases (Appendix XIl) . Using the A proposition as
an example, these Ss were shown how the proposition "All girls are humans",
while suggesting the subsetted interpretation (in reality the
set of girls is a subset of humans) , must also be interpreted as coinci-
dent sets (SAT) •
Group on the other hand, received the same information as TqQ ,
addended by instructions on the nature of the syllogistic task
(Appendix XIl) .
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Given an EEE syllogism of the first figure, they were shown how to draw
out all possible diagrammatic relationships between terms of the major
and minor premises, then to test for one negative instance of the con-
clusion in order to decide invalidity.
Finally, group Tu , instructions were supplemented by both addenda:
anti-empirical warning and information about the nature of the task.
al Blocks (B) . V/hether or not performance improves with practice
was a third variable under consideration. Each consecutive block of
nine invalid syllogisms was designated as levels of B, where contained
syllogisms 1-9
»
contained trials 10-18 and B^ incorporated 19-27.
Dependent Measure s
Two response measures were included in this design: error x-ate and
a composite error-uncertainty score. A S was asked not only to judge
whether an argument was valid or invalid, but also to indicate how sure
he was of his judgment. His response is tabulated along either the valid
or invalid 5-point scale, where the larger number denotes greater sureness.
For example, a S strongly feeling an ai'gument is invalid would record his
answers as follows:
(D
Invalid Valid
J) 4 '3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5
Error-uncertainty data was obtained by transcribing the S's recordings
into the following 9 -point scale:
Invalid Valid^
1 2 3 (TJV~n, 2 1 W 5 S's recording
0 1 2 3 4 56 9 error-uncertainty
Although valid syllogisms were included in the study, only data from
invalid syllogisms was analyzed; the larger numbers on the transformed
scale imply greater error-uncertainty. The dependent measure for each
S over all invalid syllogisms was the cumrnulative error-uncertainty score.
In addition, error rate, the more conventional measure used in
syllogism tasks was computed as the cumrnulative number of errors over
all invalid syllogisms, i.e., the number of times aS circled a number
under the valid scale.
Test Materials
Under E
c
conditions, the three qualifying terms of each of the nine
invalid syllogisms (see Appendix XII) were paralogs (Noble, 1952) or low-
meaningful CVC's (Archer, i960 ). Under E^ and E
2
conditions, the two
qualifying terms of the first premise were commonplace meaningful words
(the same used in Study l) which established the required levels of em-
piricism. The remaining term of each syllogism was a paralog or CVC.
For example, the invalid AEE syllogism in its E_ form, reads:
All gokems are riys.
No gokems are pibs.
No pibs are riys.
The same argument for the E^ condition was. transformed to:
All dogs are animals.
No dogs are kohs.
No kohs are animals.
And in the E^ condition the qualifiers were changed to:
All quarts are two pints.
No quarts are muhs.
No muhs are two pints.
To act as filler items, five valid syllogisms with meaningful first
premise terms and a paralog or CVC for the remaining term were composed
(see Appendix XIIl) . Four of these were repeated using nonsense words or
syllables for all three terms, making a total of nine valid syllogisms.
Each argument was separately dittoed on 8£- x in. sheets, which
allowed ample room for diagramming, and stapled together in a random se-
quence (see Appendix XIV) with the following restrictions: within each
block of nine invalid trials, each of the nine test arguments appeared
once three in the form, three in the E^ form and the remaining three
as Eg. Not counted in the numbering scheme were three valid filler argu-
ments per block of nine trials. Hence, within each block of trials, there
were three examples at each level of empiricism, and mean scores for each
S would consequently range from 0 to 3.
Proce dure
Subjects in the first discussion section were seated in a laige
lecture auditorium during scheduled class time. They were randomly divi-
n
ded into six equally sized groups with equal numbers of males and females.
Subjects were then relocated according to groups into different sections
of the auditorium. Each S was distributed an answer booklet, a test
booklet, and an instruction sheet corresponding to the group he was in.
Ho oral instructions were needed, except to underscore the importance of
reading the instructions carefully and to take as much time as necessary.
After completing the task and returning his materials to the proctor,
each S was handed a questionnaire which probed two issues: whether the
S had previous training in logic and whether he had employed any strate-
gies in the task which differed from those described in the instructions.
The second discussion section, which met two days later, proceeded
in a similar fashion.
Design and Analyses
Ihree analyses were under consideration.
Analysis I (C-^ - C^)
. To assess whether instructions to consider
all alternative interpretations (C
2 )
significantly improved performance
over that under standard instructions (C^, a 2( training) x 3(empdrioism) x
3(blocks) design with repeated measures on the last two factors was con-
sidered for each of the dependent measures: error rate and error-uncer-
tainty.
Analysis II (
C
2
-
Tqq) • To assess whether training to think of al-
ternative interpretations in terms of alternative Euler diagrams (t
qo )
significantly improved performance over that without graphic support (C
2)»
a 2( training) x 2(empiricism) x 3(blocks) design with repeated measures
on the last tv/o factors was considered on each of the two dependent measures.
Analysis III (Factori al) . This design attempted to assess the rela-
tive effects on performance of administering anti-empirical warning (VJ)
,
as in groups T-^q and T^ f and of providing insight into the nature of the
syllogistic task (n)
,
as in groups T^ and T^. The design under consid-
eration v/as a 2(presence or absence of V/) x 2(presence or absence of N) x
3(empiricism) x 3(blocks) with repeated measures on the last two factors
on each of the dependent measures.
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results and discussion
Study II was undertaken to test for two principle effects: whether
empirical biases would in fact alter error patterns in reasoning; and
secondly
,
whether training to guard against such empirical biases as
well as other forms of training prescribed by the model would attenuate
errors in reasoning.
Empiricism
In response to the first question, the results showed as predicted
that empirically biased premises did significantly alter the course of
reasoning. These results! were equivalent across all three analyses on
both dependent measures. Appendices XV, XVI, and XVII summarize the
AKOVA Tables, while Table 9 lists the mean errors over blocks of trials.
^
Analyses of variance for the main effect of empiricism was significant
in all three analyses (Analysis Is F ( 2 , 48 ) = 44*753, £ < .001; Analysis
II: F ( 2 , 48 ) = 66.806, 2 ^ *001; Analysis III: F ( 2 , 96 ) = 31 .918 , £ <
.001) . Newman-Kuels analyses further showed that within each analysis all
means significantly differed from each other at the 5% level of chance.
Thus as predicted, performance under conditions, where the line of
reasoning following from the empirically biased interpretation did not
disclose the invalidity of the argument, was significantly poorer than
under control situations (E^)
,
where no empirical biases were established.
On the other hand, performance was significantly heightened if the em-
pirically biased interpretation led to the disclosure of an invalid
instance of the conclusion, as with syllogisms. Here error rate was
not only lower relative to that of E^ arguments, but also as predicted
significantly lower than the control items.
TABLE 9
Mean Error Rate at Each Level of Empiricism for Each Block of Trials
All Analyses
Analyses Level of
Empiricism B
1
Block
B
2 B3
Av erage
Over
Blocks
I (Oj - C
2) Ec 1.23 1.58 1 . 92
** 1.58
E
1
1.07 1.04 1.27 1.13
E
2
2.38 2.42 2.04 2.28
11 ( C2
rW Ec 1.00 1.50
1.50*
* 1.33
E
1
.85 .92 1.08
.95
E
2
2.38 2.35 1 . 85* 2.19
III (Factorial) E
C
1.23 1.63 1.63** I .50
E
1
1.25 1.15 1.40 1.27
E2 2.31 1.88 1 . 62
*** 1.94
Note. — All means averaged over "blocks within an analysis are
significantly different from each other, £ .05 (Newnan-Kuels pro-
cedure) .
* p < .05 that preceding means within a row are significantly
different.
** p ^ .025 that preceding means within a row are significantly
different.
p / .001 that preceding means within a row are significantly
different.
***
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However, the results also indicated that the effect of these biases
became modified with practice. This E x B interaction was again signifi-
cant in all three analyses (Analysis I: F (4,96) = 3.493, £ < .029;
Analysis II; F (4,96) = 3.913, £ <.029; Analysis III: F ( 4 , 192) = 8.321,
£ < .001). The nature of these E x B interactions took the following form.
Under E^ conditions, performance deteriorated with practice. For example,
in Analysis I, mean error rate at each block of trials was = 1.00, B^ =
1.90 and B^ = I. 90 . To test whether this deterioration was significant,
^
a one-way analysis of variance (Appendix XIX) was computed on the E
,C
data (F (2,90) = 3.971, £ < .09) and indeed found that these differences
were reliable. Under E^ conditions, however, error rate remained rela-
tively constant: E-^ = . 89
,
B^ = . 92
,
B^ = 1 . 08
,
and a one-way analysis
on the E^ data shov/ed that these differences were not reliable (F ( 2 . 90 )
.490.) With E^ syllogisms, performance improved with practice: B^ = 2 . 38
,
= 2 . 35 » -- I. 89 , and the analysis on E^ data showed these differences
to be significant, F ( 2 . 90 ) = 3.829, £ C. .09* The results from Analysis
I and III were equivalent to those from Analysis II, except that the
decline in errors on E
2
syllogisms in Analysis I was not found to be sign-
i
ificant
.
In summary, the empirical biases of a premise do play a large role
in determining the outcome of reasoning in a fashion consistent with the
predictions arising from the proposed model. The greatest error rate
was associated with E
2
arguments, although performance improved with
practice; and as predicted this error rate was greater than that on the
control arguments, where performance was found to deteriorate with prac-
tice. Furthermore, least errors were found on the E^ arguments, where
performance remained stable throughout practice.
Training
Analysis I (C^ - C^). Overall performance on each of the two groups
in this analysis was practically equivalent (C^ = 1.68, C
2 =
I.64), and
the analysis of variance failed to detect a significant Training main effect,
£ (l»24) = .082. No interactions involving the training effect reached
statistical significance. Thus it appears that adding to the standard
instructions a suggestion to quantify relationships between terms, then
seek alternative interpretations, bears little if any consequence upon the
solution of syllogisms.
Analysis II (Cb, - Tq
0 )
. In this analysis both training groups were
told to seek alternative quantifications of the relationship between terms,
but 1' was instructed to use Euler diagrams to aid in their conceptual iza-
tions. While reasoning was slightly facilitated with this aid (C^ = 1 . 64,
T00 -
3 « 34) y these differences were not found to be significant, F (l,24) =
2.528; nor were any of the interactions with training significant.
Analysis HI (Factorial ) . The question asked by this analysis was
whether an anti-empirical warning (w) or an explanation into the nature
of the syllogistic task (ll) , or combination of the two, would render the
task loss difficult. Analysis of variance, contrary to prediction, failed
to show any significant differences on either W or N main effects, 01
in the VJ x N interaction. However, a significant W x N x E interaction
was disclosed, F (2,96) - 3.341, £ C .05. This relationship is represented
in Figure 2, which plots error rate as a function of
empiricism at each
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level of N. Under N
2
conditions, when Ss were warned against empirical
biases (i.e., Tn ) error rate was slightly lower than that of the unwarned
group (T
q1 ) under all E conditions, although Newman-Kuels analyses failed
to reveal any of these differences as significant. Hence, performance
at each level of empiricism was not significantly affected by the exclusion
or inclusion of empirical bias warning when Ss were told the nature of the
syllogistic task.
However, under N^ conditions, where the nature of the task was not
described, performance was critically differentiated by the addition of
anti-empirical, warning — but not in the direction originally proposed.
For Ss who received the warning, number of errors on E^, and E^
syllogisms significantly increased, according to a Newman-Kuels analysis,
while there was no significant change on E
2
arguments.
Originally it was felt that warning Ss against empirical biases would
improve performance, specifically on E2 arguments where the empirically
biased interpretations incorrectly led to a valid conclusion. By training
a S to seek an alternative, unbiased interpretation, he should come across
a negative instance of the conclusion as well. Presumably, he would thus
see the illogicality of the argument and judge it invalid. However, these
Ss were not told in the instructions what constituted an invalid argument.
They were not told that at least one negation of the conclusion invalidates
the argument. In the absence of such instruction, they may have been
thrust
into a dilemma: is the argument invalid because there is one
negative in-
stance, or is it valid because it sometimes holds. It may be that
most
Ss in the T10
group adopted the latter strategy — searching for at
least
one valid instance, and if found, judging the argument incorrectly
as
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valid — which is in complete reversal of the correct strategy. The T
QC
Ss, on the other hand, may never have reached this dilemma. Being bound
by the empiricism of the statement, they may have isolated only one in-
stance of the conclusion, that which followed from the empirically biased
interpretations. As such, they may have judged the argument valid if the
instance held, or invalid if it did not hold. The possibility that both
positive and negative instances could be found within the same argument
may never have crossed their paths.
If it is true that T^q Ss, in the absence of instructions otherwise,
adopted the incorrect strategy of searching for at least one supportive
instance, then one would expect a significant reduction in errors from
T-j Ss, who were given these instructions in addition to empirical bias
warning. As seen from Table 10 which reorganizes the E x N x W inter-
action to permit comparisons between T^q and T^
,
errors were indeed
a/ttemiated by the addition of instructions on the nature of the task.
Newman-Kuels analyses indicated the means were significantly different
at and £<.0^.
Thus it appears that anti-empirical bias training may be effective
in teaching Ss to ignore empirical biases and attend to other interpreta-
tions of the propositions. However, Ss may fail to utilize this strategy
effectively unless training is coupled with comments on the nature of the
syllogistic task. As such, N training becomes a necessary condition for
the application of W information.
Alternatively, it can be asked whether N training is sufficient in-
formation for facilitating the reasoning process. Re-examination of Table
10, this time comparing performance between TQQ and TQl ,
shows that again,
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TABLE 10
Mean Number of Errors for Each W x N x E Cell
Analysis III — Study II
Warning Level of
Empiricism
Training
T
10 T*11
W+ E
c
1.69 1.96
E
1 1.69 1 . 15*
E
2 2.18 1 .74*
T
00
T
01
c>
W- E
c 1.15 1.59
E
1 .85 1.38*
E
2 2.03 1.79
*p 4 .05 that means within the row are significantly different
from each other, Newman-Kuels procedure.
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contrary to expectation, this added information tended to increase rather
than decrease- errors, although the Newrnan-Kuels analysis showed that the
only significant difference between TQ1 and its control TQQ was on E
arguments.
Just why should Ss be in more error when given the added information
that one negative instance invalidates the argument, especially on
syllogisms where the negative instance is supposedly more obvious. It
could be possible that this added information only tended to confuse
the issue, rather than clarify it. No safeguard was employed to insure
Ss comprehended the instructions, or for that matter, even read them;
although all groups were invited to ask questions about the information
before the task began.
The questionnaire administered after a S completed the task led to
some interesting disclosures. When asked if a strategy other than the
one described in the instructions was employed, by and far the modal re-
sponse was "no", although not infrequently Ss reported substituting common
sense words for the nonsense syllables. However, a few eye-opening re-
marks were raised: "I really don't remember the instructions" (T^);
"I didn't iead the instructions closely" (Tqq) . One S remarked v/ith
poignancy, "I tried common sense; it seemed more helpful than the in-
struction sheet" (Tq1 ). The
point is, if a few Ss were honest enough to
express their disregard of the instructions, one is left wondering how
many more Ss were similarly disenchanted but more reluctant to admit it.
In any event, this study has raised more questions about the nature
of training effects than it has resolved. In general it may be concluded
that the overall effects of training were negligible. The failure to find
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significant main effects or W x N interactions attest to this. Those
training effects which were significant were linked to specific levels
of E, and analysis of this second order interaction has led to equivocal
conclusions. Subjects enter into the task with pre-established response
biases, various reactions to empirical biases and dubious strategies to
cope with either
. Attempts to modify these tendencies through written
instructions have been negligible, except where they have tended to
confuse the issue and raise the level of error.
This is not to say that these initial sets are not amenable to
change. Perhaps presenting the material orally, granting practice ex-
amples and immediate feedback, or even individualizing instruction would
have altered the course of performance. Nonetheless it stands as a monu-
ment to human habit that exposure to instructive information could not
modify these initial tendencies — perhaps even the greater tendency of
the "typical college sophomore" to disregard instructions entirely.
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COMMENTARY
The categorical syllogism — a relatively simple form of deductive
reasoning, one that can he held responsible for much of everyday decision-
making, and yet a process which for centuries has beguiled the curiosity
of philosophers and more recently the instruments of psychologists. In-
herent in these inquiries is the more surreptitious problem of whether
man's reasoning is basically rational, as exemplified by the Henle po-
sition where errors are believed to stem from a misunderstanding of the
task or a misunderstanding of the premise, or whether a reasoner's in-
ferences are being "unwittingly influenced by his convictions, wishes
or fecirs" (Morgan and Morton, 1944 )* This investigation has modeled
syllogistic reasoning to a 2-stage problem-solving task where all possi-
ble interpretations of the relationship between qualifying terms are
conceptualized as” Euler arrangements, and the resultant configurations
matched against the conclusion to test whether the conclusion is negated
in at least one instance. This model, which has bisected the "reasoning
process" into two basic components, has suggested that the nature of
syllogistic error is more complex than may have been anticipated. Indeed,
other authors have shown that Ss encounter problems with various aspects
of interpreting propositions; invalid conversions (Chapman and Chapman,
I957); non-logical use of the quantifier "some" (Prase, 1966) . Henle
(1962) had previously proposed that errors in reasoning frequently occur
because Ss restate a premise so that the intended meaning is changed.
Since her Ss were required to extract these premises from cumbersome
prose
passages, it is understandable that Ss would experience
difficulty. This
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Btudy has shown that even when only the fundamental information was
presented, Ss would let the empirical meaning of the statement regulate
their interpretations
,
and perhaps even more interesting, under empiri-
cally neutral conditions would impose their ov/n predispositions towards
some interpretations to the exclusion of others. Hence even before Ss
enter into the reasoning process £er se, they bind themselves to an
abridged version of the intended argument. As such, their answer may
not be "correct”, but does follow logically from the premises they de-
fined for themselves. Perhaps Clark (1969) has stated this more
succinctly:
...the principal difficulties inherent in rnany
reasoning problems are not due in cognitive
processes specific to those problems, but to
the very language in which the problems are
stated.
However, Study II has shown that the language in which a problem
is stated may facilitate performance as well as hinder it. The nature
of empirical biases did alter Ss' interpretations of propositions, but
this result in and of itself was of little consequence. It was when the
line of reasoning from that empirically biased interpretation led to a
valid instance of the conclusion that Ss committed more errors, for when
the line of reasoning led to an invalid conclusion, reasoning was facili-
tated.
The upshot of this is that before testing the influence of attitudes,
desires, fears, etc. on syllogistic performance, perhaps one should first
analyze the form of the argument within the framework of the present
model. Consider the following argument used in a study to test the
effects of anti-Russian attitudes cn syllogistic performance (Henle
and Michael, 1956 )
:
Two groups of Ss, one with anti-Russian attitudes and the second
group with more neutral attitudes towards the Russians were asked to
select which of the four conclusions followed from the premises. More
the only correct answer was This, coupled with results from other
examples which also showed little differentiation in performance between
groups, led the authors to conclude that "the results of an individual’s
reasoning need not be predetermined by the attitudes he holds".
But did the authors provide an optimum test for the influence of
attitudes? Consider the first premise which stated that "All Russians
are Bolsheviks". Since the converse that all Bolsheviks (B) are
Russians (R) is empirically true, this premise may have suggested to
both groups of Ss that the two terms are equated, i.e. . The
since in reality there are no Bolsheviks who are not Russians. If the
If all Russians are Bolsheviks and
Some Bolsheviks regiment people:
1. All Russians regiment people.
2. All who regiment people are Russians.
3. Some who regiment people are Russians.
4.
Some Russians do not regiment people.
5.
None of the above is a valid conclusion.
than HOfo cf the Ss in both groups selected the third conclusion, although
goes against the empirical bias
stricted to that following from the identicalline of reasoning was re
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pet interpretation, then incorporation of the second premise "Some
Bolsheviks (B) regiment people (p)", would lead to four configurations
support conclusion #3, that some who regiment people are Russians.
Hence, these results are predictable from the framework of the
present model; the selection of the third conclusion is readily accounted
for by an empirical bias effect. As for the influence of attitudes, it
is difficult to comprehend where in this analyses additudinal biases could
come into play, if indeed they are capable of having an effect. If they
are expected to bias prejudiced Ss' interpretations of the first premise
towards
,
no differentiation between groups would be expected
Eince this is confounded with an empirical bias effect. On the other
hand, for prejudiced Ss to adopt the alternative interpretation
would not only be incongruent with reality, but also no more consistent
with an anti-Russian attitude. Assuming that there are Bolsheviks who
a„re not Russians indeed appears more consistent with a pro-Russian
attitude. Hence, little differentiation between the two groups on the
interpretation of the first premise may be expected. Attitudes may
also play a role when incorporating the second premise into the first
and discerning the resultant configurations. But again little differ-
entiation would be expected between group performances in selecting a
conclusion since, as we saw from the above analysis, all instances
following from the empirically biased interpretation led to adoption of
conclusion #3. This is not to say that attitudes have no appreciable
effect upon the reasoning process, but that this particular syllogism
may not have provided an adequate test for it. Henle and Michael
selected
) , all of which
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this item to include in their publication because it yielded "typical
results". However, the other items which similarly were unable to
differentiate between the two groups, may also have been confounded with
empirical biases. The authors did include the following syllogism be-
cause it gave the largest differences between groups:
If no atheists are found under a dictatorship and
no dictatorship exists in Russia:
1. No atheists are found in Russia.
2. Some atheists are found in Russia.
3. All atheists are found in Russia.
4« Some Russians are atheists.
None of the above is a valid conclusion.
The first premise, "No atheists (A) are found under a dictatorship
(D) is not ambiguous, since there is only one interpretation to an E
proposition Consideration of the second premise, No dictator-
ship (i)) exists in Russia (R), leads to a number of configurations:
• @) (D •
Unlike the previous syllogism, in this argument there is no conclusion
which holds in all instances. It may now be possible to get differenti-
ation between groups. Subjects responding correctly would select #5,
as indeed did. 44$ of the Ss in the neutral group, but only 28% of those
in the anti-Russian group. Instead, there was a greater tendency for
anti-Russian Ss to select #2 (Some atheists are found in Russia) and #4
(Some Russians are atheists), which are consistent with the predictions
that Ss would select a conclusion congruent with their attitudes.
Just wliy did these Ss less favorable towards Russia arrive at these
"illogical" conclusions. Was it because they failed to consider the
last
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mentioned configuration 00®, which was the one instance which
negated their belief that some atheists are found in Russia? Or did the
error occur because they failed to understand the nature of the syllogis-
tic task; that is, instead of rejecting conclusions //2 and //4 because
these were not supported in all instances, they accepted them as valid,
because they held in the majority of cases.
In any case, there is evidence that Ss* attitudes do influence
their performance on reasoning problems, as indeed most of the studies
have attested to® But just how and where this influence enters into the
reasoning process — and indeed to what extent the results of previous
studies are confounded by empirical biases — is as yet only speculative.
As Henle and Michael suggest:
Distortions of cognitive processes by needs or
attitudes do, of course, occur. It may be,
however, that this is not the most important
kind of influence nor that most likely at
the onset to give us an understanding of the
nature of the interrelation of these pro-
cesses. As a possibly more fruitful formu-
lation of the problem, the following is sugges-
ted: What changes can motivational processes
produce in accordance with the structure of
the material on which they act?
Had Ss been asked to use Euler diagrams while solving the problems,
it would have been possible to trace the course of reasoning and
possibly isolate how or where their reasoning went awry. Since pre-
judiced Ss tend to show rigidity with problem solving tasks (Rokeach,
1949) and perceptual perseveration (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949) i it may be
that they interpret propositions in fewer possible ways than their less-
biased counterparts, possibly by latching on to that interpretation
which conforms to their attitudes; perhaps they constrict themselves
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to fewer configurations when incorporating the second premise, or are
more inclined to accept a conclusion as valid even if it does not hold
in all instances, so long as it favors their attitudes. An analysis of
such problems within the framework of the present model may help identify
which link in the process of reasoning is most susceptible to motivational
factors. Although the direction so far in this section has been an
attempt to provide some closure on previous discrepancies regarding the
nature of syllogistic error, perhaps the most interesting finding from
this investigation is one that has little recourse to previous studies,
and that is the nature of response biases. As mentioned earlier, some
fluctuations in responding to certain modes under neutral conditions were
expected, but the extent of these, and certainly their permanence, was
unanticipated and has led to perhaps the more interesting questions of
this investigation. Just where do these response biases come from? Just
why are some interpretations so easily discerned, while others are
practically ignored? Are these biases peculiar to syllogistic proposi-
tions, or could it be they reflect more generic patterns in the way peo-
ple view the world — more generalized strategies designed to grapple
with the multiplicity and complexity of one's environment.
Consider the preferences for describing the I proposition. The
order of describing this proposition, from most to least frequent, was
(3© - © t * There a progF6551011
in this series which is intriguing! the set for the subject of the sen-
tence © in each successive diagram incorporates more of the predi-
cate (©) • The S moves from mere intersect in the first diagram, to
a subset of P, then the same set as P, and finally a supraset of P.
70
Examining this progression more closely, one notices that in the
first diagram, the only assumption made about S and P is that a rela-
tionship exists between them; there is some common variance, but nothing
is stated about the remaining elements. On the other hand, consider
the second diagram
• This figure is more "restrictive" than the
first since it has assumed that all S are P; but it is less restrictive
than the third figure where it is also assumed that all P are S.
Thus in each of these three progressive figures (more will be said
about the fourth figure later), greater restrictions are made concerning
the nature of the relationship between the two terms. In the first, it
is merely assumed that a relationship exists between the two terms, or
that P is some attribute of S. In the second, S is a subset of P, But
in the third, the two sets are identical; in other words, S and P are
redundant in the sense that they explain the exact same variance. Hence,
the most frequent mode for interpreting the I proposition reflects the
least restrictive strategy of defining relationships among events in the
world. Indeed this strategy may be quite successful when applied to the
"real world". Compare the frequency of terms which are attributes of
each other, and most certainly the frequency of terms which are absolutely
identical. In other words, a strong case may be presented that these
model preferences reflect occurrences in the natural environment.
subsetted relationship between the two terms, why should this diagram
be less frequent than . One thing that distinguishes this
’What of the least preferred mode ? Since this assumes a
diagram from the other three used to describe the I proposition is that
this is the only instance where S is greater than P. In the other three
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diagrams, S may be equal, but is usually less than P. There is the possi-
bility that an "atmosphere effect" may be established by the word "Some".
Thus, when given "Some S are P", the quantifier "some" rnay set up an at-
mosphere of smallness and suggest to the S that S should be less than P.
As for the other two types of propositions, the same principles used
to explain variations in responding to the I proposition may be operative.
In the A proposition, the order of preference was and (s\^
. This
follows directly from the analysis considered for the I proposition; that
is, strategies to select these could be predicted from "real world" events.
The occurrence of identities in the real world is less frequent than that
of subsets.
In the 0 proposition, again, the analysis follows that for the I
Given the premise that "Some S are not P", the probability in terms of
"real life" events is that at least some elements are held in common.
Certainly this is less restrictive than assuming that the terms are com-
plete opposites and hold no elements in common. As for the least frequent
definition
»
since again this is the one definition which requires
the S to assume S is greater than P. the results may be attributable to
an atmosphere effect.
This analysis of response biases is in no way intended to be defini-
tive, and certainly needs more direct empirical investigation before more
substantive conclusions about the inception of response biases can be
drawn. It should be noted, however, that other authors, particularly
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (19 56) have noted tendencies for Ss to favor
certain strategies when solving concept attainment tasks. Specifically,
their Ss found conjunctive concepts easier to isolate than disjunctive
proposition. The order of preference was
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ones. A conjunctive category is one defined by the joint presence of
certain attributes, e.g. a member of Chi Delta fraternity is one v.-ho has
received formal initiation and has paid his annual dues. A disjunctive
category, however, is one where either or both attributes are sufficient
for defining the class. Thus in baseball a "walk" occurs either when
four balls have been pitched or when a pitched ball hits the batter.
Brunei, e t. al . contend that difficulty in attaining disjunctive con-
cepts in controlled laboratory studies may be related to their rarety
outside the laboratory
. For example, qualifications for membership into
relatively new organizations tend to be disjunctive, e.g. a "clinical
psychologist" may be defined initially as one who has had graduate
training in psychology, or one who regardless of academic training has
had experience dealing with disturbed people, or one who merely elects
to call himself as such. But, as the classification "clinical psychologist"
becomes more institutionalized, the qualifications for membership become
more conjunctive: one must have passed an examination, and received a
certain level of schooling at certain APA approved institutions, and be
of a certain a,ge, etc. Hence, the more defined a classification becomes,
the more likely it will pass from disjunctive to conjunctive definition.
So too in science, if one finds, for example, that either insulin subcoma
or electric shock therapy tends to abate the symptoms of psychosis, one
then tends to seek the common denominator, to discover what these two
treatments hold in common, or in other words to find a conjunctive way
of defining "effective therapy".
Thus the notion that strategies based upon events in the "real world"
is not alien to the field of problem-solving, and so it may be that the
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response biases encountered in this investigation are similarly based.
These biases may result in various degrees of efficacy in the problem-
solving task, but labelling them errors add3 little to our unde islanding,
or as Bruner, ert. al. have stated:
It is a nice problem how these tendencies
come about, whether, as we have suggested,
the structure of our language and logic
imposes them upon us. Little is added by
calling them errors. They are independent
variables, these tendencies, whose determinants
have yet to be discovered. We suspect that
such misestimates derive from larger scale
strategies of problem-solving. .. .These
deformations, though they may lead to
inefficient behavior in particular pro-
blem-solving situations, may represent
highly efficient strategies when viewed in
the broader context of a person's normal life.
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FOOTNOTES
Subjects also recorded their sureness of each judgment, which provides
an additional
,
more sensitive measure, since it assesses variations
within each valid and invalid heading. However, it lacks face validity
as well as generality to other studies on syllogistic reasoning which,
for the most part, analyze only the number of errors in judgment. Con-
sequently it was decided to retain error rate as the dependent measure
for the pilot work.
^While it is more meaningful to talk about syllogistic performance in
terms of error rate, error-uncertainty is a more sensitive measure,
since it assesses variations within each valid and invalid category.
Thus some effects may achieve statistical significance with error-
uncertainty data, but not with error data. Yet it is primarily those
effects powerful enough to produce statistical differences in error
rate which are really "significant".
^Because neutral qualifiers were used in the EN propositions of 0^,
these items contained no empirical biases. Hence, 0-^ items were
arbitrarily assigned to levels of ET for each type of proposition in
order to make the comparisons with ET items of group 0^.
4lt is interesting to note that in both of these exceptions, the mode
was one infrequently responded to in the neutral conditions.
Tnus it
may be that because Ss in were provided biased
examples of this mode
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they were in effect "introduced" to it, and more likely to consider it
even when exposed to inappropriate biases.
5Both errors and error-uncertainty data were analyzed, however, the
results were virtually identical, so the results and discussion will
be limited to error data. The error-uncertainty data has been included
in Appendix XVIII.
Sjewman-Kuels were not used to assess simple effects on these E x B
interactions, since interest was not whether specific pairs of means
significantly differed from each other, but whether the blocks effect
was significant for a particular type of empirical bias.
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appendix I
Commentary on Categorical Syllogisms
The categorical syllogism consists of three statements, or pos-
itions, where the reasoned task is to judge whether the last proposition,
or conclusion, can validly be drawn from the information given in the pre-
ceding two propositions. The first proposition is called the major premise,
and the second the minor premise. The following is an example of a valid
syllogism:
B C
Major Premise All cats are animals.
A B
All tigers are cats.
A C
Some tigers are animals
.
Minor premise
Conclusion
Ihe structural components of a syllogism in formal logic are as
follows: A proposition consists of two qualifying terms connected by a
form of the verb "to be" plus a quantifier that expresses the relationship
between the tv/o terms. Thus in the major premise above the qualifiers
"cats" and "animals" are quantified by "all".
There are only four quantifiers: all, no, some, and some/not.
These see described as follows:
A All X are Y.
E No X are Y.
I Some X are Y
.
0 Some X axe not Y.
The mood of a syllogism refers to the sequence of quantifying terms
used in the three propositions. Thus AAI is the mood of the above
Universal affirmative
Universal negative
Particular affirmative
Particular negative
syllogism.
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Qualifying terms in no way affect the validity of an argument.
Substituting words, numbers, letters, diagrams, etc. will not alter the
logic in any way. Thus for all intents and purposes, the meaning of a
statement may be ignored. However, the mood of an argument does affect
its validity. If the conclusion of the above argument were to read
Some tigers are not animals'*, a change to mood AIO, the argument would
no longer be valid.
Only one other factor besides mood affects the validity of a syllogism
— its figure. Figure is described by the arrangement of qualifying
terms in the two premises. The major premise must state the relationship
between the predicate of the conclusion (above, C) and the middle term (B)
,
but there are no stipulations on the order of presenting these terms;
either B may appear before C, or C before B. Likewise, terms of the minor
premise may be arranged in either order, as long as these terms are the
subject of the conclusion (A) and the middle term (B). The four resultant
configurations, known as syllogistic figures, are presented below:
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure
Major premise B - C C - B B - C C - B
Minor premise A - B A - B B - A B - A
Conclusion A - C A - C A - C A - C
The initial example above is a first figure valid syllogism. But if
the major premise were changed to "All animals are cats", resulting in a
change to the second figure, the argument would no longer be valid.
The logical invalidity of the immediate example does not result from
empirical invalidity of the major premise, since as stipulated earlier
qualifying terms in no way alter the argument. Consider the following
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first figure AAA syllogism, which is valid:
All animals are cats.
All raccoons are animals.
All raccoons are cats.
We know from practical experience that the major premise is not true;
furthermore the conclusion is not empirically true. However, the argu-
ment is valid, and all raccoons would be cats if in fact all animals were
cats. The empiricism of any argument simply has no effect whatsoever on
its logical validity. The only determinants of logical validity are mood
and figure.
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APPENDIX II
Instructions — Pilot Study
All DOC arc MOR. (Major premise)
All BER are DOC. (Minor premise)
All BER are MOR. (Conclusion)
This argument is called a syllogism. It consists of two propositions
called the major and minor premises, followed by a third statement called
the conclusion. Your task in this experiment will be to judge whether or
not the conclusion logically follows from the information given in the
premises, and to record hov sure you are that your answer is right. In
other words, your task is two-fold: a validity judgment and a sureness
rating for each syllogism.
On your answer sheet you will find two sets of numbers from one to
five. The choice under one set means you believe the conclusion is validly
drawn from the premises, whereas a choice under the other set means that
you believe the argument is invalid. The numbers under Valid and Invalid
indicate different degrees of sureness. The larger the number, the greater
your indication of sureness:
5 = certain
4 c almost certain
3 * fairly certain
2 = somewhat uncertain
1 = uncertain
For example, if you are certain the argument is logically valid, mark
your answer sheet like this:
Invalid
5 4 321 12 3
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If you are certain it is invalid, mark your answer sheet like thic:
©.Invalid Valid4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5
If you are uncertain about the validity of the argument, but have a
feeling it is invalid, indicate as follows:
Invalid ^ Valid
5 4 3 7 (V) 12 3 4 5
To recapitulate then, you are to judge whether the argument is or is
not valid; in other words whether the conclusion can or cannot be logi-
cally drawn from the information given in the preceding two premises.
Then judge the sureness of your validity judgment and circle a number
from one to five (five indicating the most sureness) under the desired
Valid or Invalid heading. For each syllogism you must circle one num-
ber. I repeat, you must respond to every item. If you cannot decide,
then guess.
(The following is for the "some" group only:)
One final word: in logical syllogisms, the word "some" is defined
as "at least one". This definition is quite different from the one v:e
use in everyday conversation. Here, "some" could mean "a few", "many",
and even "all" — but at least one.
If there are any questions, ask the proctor now before beginning.
Remember, do not write in the booklet of syllogisms ...only on the answer
sheet.
(The following is for the "at least one" group only:)
One final word: in logical syllogisms the phrase "at least one
refers to a variety of quantities. It could mean "a few", "many",
and
even "all" — but at least one.
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If there are any questions, ask the proctor now before beginning.
Remember, do not write in the booklet of syllogisms
...only on the answer
sheet.
APPENDIX III
Instructions for Groups T* and — Study I
This experiment will present you with a series of statements called
propositions. Each proposition consists of two terms connected hy the
verb ’’are", plus a quantifier that expresses the relationship between the
two terms. For example,
quantifies the relationship between terms A and B.
Your task in this experiment is to describe the relationship between
the two terms using diagrams. Consider that each term consists of a set
of elements enclosed within a circle. Thus the term ’’A" would be diagrammed
Since the quantifier “no" implies that no one of the elements in set
A is also an element of set B, then we would diagram this proposition as
two mutually exclusive sets:
proposition can be diagrammed.
[The following four diagrams are the only other possible ways to
diagram relationships between two sets of items, but they are not des
criptive of the “no" proposition since in each instance one of the A
elements is included in B:
“No A are B"
is a proposition, where “no"
This is the only way that this
Sets A and B coincide
Set A is included in B
to
Set B is included in A
Sets A and B overlap ]
For some propositions, there is more than one interpretation of the
relationship Between terms. In such a case you should draw more than one
diagram to correspond to each interpretation. Remember to interpret each
proposition in all possible ways.
Record your diagrams on the front of each sheet, directly under the
proposition they describe. Label each circle with the initial letter of
the term which it describes. For your convenience in the propositions
that follow, this initial letter will always be typed in parentheses
directly following the term.
The word "some*' in this experiment will be defined as "at least one".
This definition is quite different from the one we use in everyday con-
versation. Here "some" could mean "a few", "many", and even "all" — but
at least one. For example, if a statement reads "Some A's are B's", it
could imply that a few A’s are B's, many A's are B's, or all A's are B's.
Similarly, a sentence reading "Some A's are not B's" could imply that a
few A's are not B's, many A's are not B's, or that all A's are not B's
(or that no A's are B's).
Remember, your task is to describe the relationship between the two
terms of each proposition that follows by using circular diagrams. If
there are ary questions please ask the proctor for assistance now before
beginning. After starting you may refer back to this instruction sheet,
but do not refer back to any previous propositions. Once you have turned
over a sheet in your test booklet, I repeat, do not go back.
instructions for
^
are determined by excluding the information cited
between brackets.
appendix IV
Items Used for Each Category of Empiricism
EMPIRICALLY TRUE
2^2
All dogs are animals,
All lettuce are vegetables.
All elms are trees.
A Proposition
ET
1 @)
All female horses are mares.
All humans are people.
All quarts are 2 pints.
5 Proposition
ET, ©©
No v/ars are peaces.
i Proposition
Mi,
Some movie stars are politicians.
Some soldiers are husbands.
Some pretty things are girls.
Some trousers are garments.
Some radishes are vegetables.
Some kangaroos are animals.
BT
2 ©
Some 0° Centigrade are 32° Fahrenheit.
Some right angles are 90 angles.
Some tons are 2,000 pounds.
Some guns are rifles.
Some candy bars are Almond Joys.
Some diseases are cancer.
0 Proposition
EE, ©E>
Some cooks are not men.
Some puzzles are not games.
Some gases are not fxiels.
ET3 ©
Some birds are not robins.
Some beers are not Schlitz.
Some buildings are not skyscrape
et
2 (D0
Some raccoons are not bricks.
Some dungarees are not refrigerators.
Some fingers are not toes.
EMPIRICALLY FALSE
All books are telephones.
All mothers are fathers.
All oceans are fountains.
Some birds are cows.
Some matches are feet.
Some sisters are brothers.
Some tuna are net fish. No timepieces are clocks.
Some typewriters are not machines.
Some saxophones are not instruments.
EMPIRICALLY NEUTRAL
First Block — 10 Items
All rompins are zics.
All luhs are gokems.
All riys are naqus.
Some sagroles are not quipsons.
Some tarops are not piws.
Some yems are not quys.
Second Block — 18 Residual Items
AH jubs are gojeys.
All delpins are brugens.
All vecs are zurs.
Some tehs are not nostaws.
Some sagroles are not bofs.
Some nuks are not muks.
Some huvs are not quipsons.
Some tarops are not Pegs.
Some jids are not cebs.
Third Block — 1C) Items
All tuhs are rompins.
All fiks are qots.
All gokems are ciqs.
Some pehs are not viys.
Some lihs are not zumaps.
Some zogs are not kuxs.
Fourth Block — 10 Terminal Items
All gojeys are delpins.
All zers are brugens.
All tazs are kohs.
Some meardons are not latuks.
Some kecs are not nostaws.
Some bexs are not tuys.
Some polefs are kaysens.
Some tihs are volvaps.
Some vebs are kahs.
No gevs are mebs.
Some pobs are neglans.
Some bujs are pibs.
Some balaps are fuys.
Some mevs are kaysens.
Some volvaps are qoys.
Some wuvs are vigs.
Some yins are kucs.
Some tefs are meardons.
Some latuks are kiqs.
Some kupods are qew.
Some cohs are zus.
Some duys are polifs.
No teys are zirs.
Some neglans are balaps.
Some kupods are niqs.
Some gajs are zays.
No zumaps are wibs.
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APPENDIX X
Instructions for Group - Study II
No Y are Z. (Major premise)
All X are Y. (Minor premise)
Some X are not Z. (Conclusion)
This argument is called a syllogism. It consists of two proposi-
tions called the major and minor premises, followed by a third statement
called the conclusion. Your task in this experiment will be to judge
whether or not the conclusion logically follows from the information given
in the. premises, and to record how sure you are that your answer is
right. In other words, your task is two-fold: a validity judgment and
a sureness rating for each syllogism.
In order to judge the validity of an argument, you should proceed
as follows. Notice that each proposition consists of two terms connected
by the verb "are' 1
,
plus a quantifier that expresses the relationship
between the two terms. For example, in the major premise above (No Y are
Z), "no" is the quantifier — it quantifies the relationship between
terms "Y" and "Z".
As you proceed with this experiment you will be confronted with
quantifiers other than "no". You may find more than one way to interpret
these propositions. In such a case, you should consider all
interpreta-
tions when judging the validity of the argument. For example, the minor
premise above employs the quantifier "all". There are
two interpretations
to this proposition, and both must be considered
before deciding whether
or not the conclusion is valid. The important
point is to remember to
9 9
interpret each proposition in all possible ways.
When interpreting these propositions, you should keep one other
thing in mind. The quantifier "some" when used in formal syllogisms is
defined as "at least one". This definition is quite different from the
one we use in. everyday conversation. Here "some" could mean "a few",
"many", and even "all" — but at least one. For example, if a statement
read "Some A are B", it could imply that a few A are B, many A are B,
or all A are B. Similarly, a proposition reading "Some A are not B" could
imply that a few A are not B, many A are not B, or that all A are not B
(or that no A are B) . Remember, you are to consider all of these inter-
pretations when you are judging the validity of the argument.
Once you have interpreted the propositions and decided upon the
validity of the argument, you should record your ansv-jer as follows. On
your answer sheet, you will find two sets of numbers from one to five.
The choice under one set means you believe the conclusion is validly
drawn from the premises, whereas a choice under the other set means that
you believe the argument is invalid. The numbers under Valid and Invalid
indicate different degrees of sureness. The larger the number, the
greater your indication of sureness:
For example, if you are certain the argument is logically valid,
mark your answer sheet like this:
5 = certain
4 = almost certain
3 = fairly certain
2 = somewhat uncertain
1 = uncertain
Invalid Valid
5 4 3 2 1 1
2 3
96
If you are certain it is invalid, mark your answer sheet like this:
Invalid Valid
(jV) 4321 12349
If you are uncertain about the validity of the argument, but have a
feeling it is invalid, indicate as follows:
Invalid Valid
9 4 3 12 3 " 4 9
To recapitulate then, after considering viable alternative inter-
pretations to each proposition, you are to judge whether or not the
entire syllogism is valid: in other words whether the conclusion can
or cannot be logically drawn from the information given in the preceding
two premises. Then judge the sureness of your validity judgment and
circle a number from one to five (five indicating the most sureness)
under the desired Valid or Invalid heading. Remember that "some" is
defined as "at least one". For each syllogism you must circle one num-
ber. I repeat, you must respond to every item. If you cannot decide,
then guess.
If there are any questions, ask the proctor now before beginning.
After starting you may refer back to this instruction sheet, but do not
go back to any previous syllogisms for reference or to change an answer.
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APPENDIX XI
Instructions for Factorial Groups - Study II
No Y are Z. (Major premise)
All X are Y. (Minor premise)
Some X are not Z. (Conclusion)
This argument is called a syllogism. It consists of tv;o proposi-
tions called the major and minor premises, followed by a third state-
ment called the conclusion. Your task in this experiment will be to
judge whether or not the conclusion logically follows from the infor-
mation given in the premises, and to record how sure you are that your
answer is right. In other words, your task is two- fold: a validity
judgment and a sureness rating for each syllogism.
In order to judge the validity of the argument you should proceed
as follows. Notice that each proposition consists of two terms connected
by the verb ''are", plus a quantifier that expresses the relationship
between the two terras. For example, in the first premise above (No Y
are Z)
,
"no" is the quantifier — it quantifies the relationship between
terms "Y" and "Z".
As you proceed you should use what are called Euler diagrams to
help you conceptualize the relationship between terms. First, consider
that the Y term consists of a set of elements enclosed within a circle.
circle is composed of Y elements; the space outside the circle is com-
posed of elements which are not Y. Similarly, the term Z should be
Thus the term Y would be envisioned All the space within the
conceptualized as a circle, (z) » which surrounds the set of Z elements.
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Kow, since the quantifier "no” tells us that no Y's are Z's, we learn
that no element in set Y is an element of set Z. The appropriate Euler
diagram is
»
where the sets are mutually exclusive; in other
words they hold no elements in common.
There are only four other Euler diagrams which describe various
relationships between two sets of terms, but they do not apply to the
"no" proposition, since as we see from each instance below, at least one
of the A elements is included in B.
Sets Y and Z coincide
Set Y is included in Z
Set Z is included in Y
Set Y and Z overlap
In those propositions which employ a quantifier other than "no”,
interpretation of the relationship between terms is more ambiguous. For
example, there are two interpretations to the proposition "All X are Y”:
(^Y) where X is a subset of Y, and (*©) where X and Y coincide.
In such a case, you must consider both interpretations when judging the
validity of the conclusion.
(Following information between asterisks concerns anti-empiricism
training. It was omitted for groups TQ0 and TQ1 0
*Furthermore, the empiricism of a statement in no way affects its
interpretations. For example, "All girls (X) are humans (Y)
u may more
readily suggest (^)v) , since we know from practical experience that
"girls"
are a subset of "humans". Despite this fact, you still must consider
the other interpretation (*&) when making your validity judgment — even
though it is not true empirically that the set of girls is
one and the
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same as the set of humans. Thus there are two, always two and only two,
interpretations to any "all" proposition: and (x?Y^
. you
should not restrict yourself to that interpretation which conforms to
the empiricism. Similarly, there is one and only one interpretation to
any "no" proposition, regardless of the empiricism:
. Even if
the statement read "No men (X) are fathers (Y) — which is empirically
meaningless —~ it should still be diagrammed as ©0 , since the
quantifier tells us that no men are fathers. The point to remember is
that regardless of what quantifier is employed, you should not base
your interpretation on the empiricism of the statement. You must con-
sider all interpretations when judging the validity of the argument.*
(The following information between the asterisks concerned training
on the nature of the syllogistic task. It was omitted in instructions
for groups and T^q.)
*Once you have quantified the relationships between terms of the
major and minor premises, you must then decide whether the conclusion
can validly be drawn from the information given in the premises. Specif-
ically, this means you must consider all possible arrangements between
the three sets of terms as they were established by the premises, then
check to see if the conclusion holds in every instance. For example,
if given the syllogism:
No B are C.
No A are B.
No A are C.
you would diagram the major premise as
Similarly, you would diagram the minor
(Major premise)
(Minor premise)
(Conclusion)
mutually exclusive
premise as mutually
sets, (6)(c)
exclusive
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sets, ©© .Now combine the two sets of diagrams in as many
ways as possible within the limits established by the premises -
in other words, so that no A are B and no B are C. As it turns out,
there are five possible arrangements between the three terms:
0) (D©0 ( 4 ) © @
(2) ©@) (5) (7)^
(3) ©
Four of these instances (2,3,4, 5) do not support the conclusion
that "No A are C", since as we see from the diagrams, at least one A is
included in the set of C's in each of these four cases. Therefore, the
syllogism is invalid. Even if there was only one instance which did not
support the conclusion, the argument would still be invalid. For a
syllogism to be valid, all possible arrangements derived from the pre-
mises must lead to positive instances of the conclusion. The occurrance
of one negative instance necessitates a judgment of invalid.*
When interpreting these propositions, you should keep one other
thing in mind. The quantifier "some" when used in formal syllogisms is
defined as "at least one". This definition is quite different from the
one we use in everyday conversation. Here "some" could mean "a few",
"many", or even "all" — but at least one. For example, if a statement
read "Some A are B", it could imply that a few A are B, many A are B, or
that all A are B. Similarly, a proposition reading "Some A are not B"
could imply that a few A are not B, many A are not B, or that all A are
not B (or that no A are B) . Remember, you are to consider all of these
interpretations when you are judging the validity of the argument.
Once you have interpreted the propositions and decided upon the
Ill
validity of the argument, you should record your answer as follows. On
your answer sheet, you will, find two sets of numbers from one to five.
The choice under one set meaire you believe the conclusion is validly
drawn from the premises, whereas a choice under the other set means that
you believe the argument is invalid. The numbers under Valid and Invalid
indicate different degrees of sureness. The larger the number, the
greater your indication of sureness:
5 = certain
4 «= almost certain
3 = fairly certain
2 somewhat uncertain
1 = uncertain
For example, if you are certain the argument is logically valid,
mark your answer sheet like this:
Invalid
_
Valid
5 'A 3 2 1 1 2 3 4
If you are certain it is invalid, mark your answer sheet like this:
Invalid Valid
(jp 4 3" 2 1 1 2 3 4 5
If you are uncertain about the validity of the argument, but have a
feeling it is invalid, indicate as follows:
Invalid
_
Valid
5 4 3 2 "(I) 1 2 3 4 5
To recapitualte then, after considering viable alternative inter-
pretations to each proposition, you are to judge whether or not the
entire syllogism is valid: in other words whether the conclusion can
or cannot be logically drawn from the information given in the preceding
two premises, (information within asterisks was omitted for Iqq and ^q*)
Remember, a conclusion is valid only if it follows from all possible
diagrammatic relationships among the premises.* Then judge the sureness
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of yoixr validity judgment and circle a number from one to five (five
indicating the most sureness) under the desired Valid or Invalid heading.
Remember that "some" is defined as "at least one" (information within
asterisks was omitted for TQ0 and TQ1 ) *and that the empiricism of a
statement in no way affects its interpretations.* For each syllogism
you must circle one number. You need not draw out all the diagrammatic
relationships, if you feel that you can conceptualize some of them more
efficiently in your head. Eut you must make a validity judgment on every
syllogism. If you cannot decide, then guess.
If there are any questions, ask the proctor now before beginning.
After starting you may refer back to this instruction sheet, but do not
go back tc any previous syllogisms for reference or to change an answer.
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APPENDIX XIII
Valid Syllogisms Used as Filler Items
EIO 3
rd
FIGURE
No wars are peaces.
Some wars are metis
Some mebs are not peaces.
No qeys are piws
.
Some qeys are sics.
Some zics are not piws.
EAO 4
th
FIGURE
No brothers are sisters.
All sisters are wibs.
Some wibs are not brothers.
No pehs are tihs
.
All tihs are bexs.
Some bexs are not pehs*
A00 2
nd
FIGURE
All lettuce are vegetables.
Some tarops are not vegetables.
Some tarops are not lettuce.
All tuys are zumaps
.
Some gevs are not zumaps.
Some gevs are not tuys.
All l
St
FIGURE
All humans are people.
Some teys are humans.
Some teys are people.
All cohs are delpins.
Some gajs are cohs.
Some gajs are delphins.
IAI 3
rd
FIGURE
Some diseases are cancer.
All diseases are polefs.
Some polefs are cancer.
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APPENDIX XIV
Random Sequence of Items for Study II
Position Mood Figure Empiricism
1 0AI 3 E2
2 III 3 EC
3 IEE 2 E
1
EIO 3
4 AEE 3 EC
5 AAO 4 E2
EAO 4
6 IAO 4 E
1
7 100 1 E2
A00 2
8 010 2 E1
9 OEE 1 EC
10 100 1 Ec
11 010 2 E2
All 1
12 AEE 3 E 1
IAI 3
13 IAO 4 E2
14 AAO 4 E 1
19 OAI 3 EC
EIO 3
16 OEE 1 E2
17 IEE 2
E
C
18 III 3 E 1
1G7
APPENDIX XIV
Continued
Position Mood Figure Empi ricism
19 010 2 E
c
EAO 4
20 OAI 3 E
1
21 IEE 2 e
2
A00 2
22 OEE 1 E
1
23 IAO 4 E
c
24 AEE 3 E2
25 AAO 4 EC
All 1
26 100 1 E1
27 III 3 E2
Note. — Un-numbered items are valid filler items
K.8
APPENDIX XV
ANOVA Tables for Error and Error-Uncertainty Data
Analyses I — Study 11
Source of Error Data Error-Uncertainty Data
Variance P df F df
Between Ss
T .082 1,24 00• 1,24
Within Ss
E 44-753 2
,
48*** 47.015 2
,
48***
TE .964 2,48 1.124 2,48
B .793 2,48 .654 2,48
TB .320 2,48 .277 2,48
EB 3.493 4,96** 2.854 4,96*
TEB I. 85O 4,96 2.003 4,98
T = Training * 2 ^
E = Empiricism of first premise ** 2 £ .025
B = Blocks *** £ < *001
APPENDIX XVI
ANOVA Tables for Error and Error-Uncertainty Data
Analyses II -- Study II
Source of Error Data Error-Uncertainty Data
Variance F df F df
Between Ss
T 2.528 1,24 3.313 1,24
Within Ss
E 66.806 2
,
48*** 73.011 2
,
48***
.280 2,48 .206 2,48
B .875 2,48 •573 2,48
TB .145 2,48 .227 2,48
EB 3.513 4*96* 4.300 4,96**
TEB 1.766 4,98 1.807 4,96
T = Training . * £ < .025
E = Empiricism of first premise ** £ ^ * 01
B = Blocks *** 2 < .001
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APPENDIX XVII
ANOVA Tables for Error & Error-Uncertainty Data
Analyses III — Study II
Source of Error Data Error-Uncertainty Data
Variance P df F df
Between Ss
W 1.331 1,48 1.770 1,48
N .113 1,48 .090 1,48
WN 3.698 1,48 2.101 1,48
Within Ss
E 31.918 2
,
96*** 47.133 2
,
96***
WE 1.282 2,96 1.448 2,96
NE 4.318 2
,
96** 4.067 2,96**
WNE 3.341 2,96* 3.467 2,96*
B .157 2,96 0.733 2,96
WB .011 2,96 .044 2,96
NB 1.098 2,96 .530 2,96
WNB .996 2,96 1.392 2,96
EB 8.231 4,192*** 8.812 4,192***
WEB .749 4,192 .324 4,192
NEB .640 4,192 .714 4,192
WNEB .491 4,192 .388 4,192
W = Warning against empirical bias
N = Nature of the syllogistic task
E = Empiricism of first premise
B = Blocks
* 2 ^ .05
** p 4 .025
*** p 4. .001
Ill
APPENDIX XVI II
Error-Uncertainty Data on Significant Effects Discussed in Text
TABLE A
Mean Error-Uncertainty at Each
for Bach Block of 1
All Analyses
Level of
Trials
Empiricism
Analysis Level of Block
Av erage
Over
Empirici cm B-^ — B
2
B
3
Blocks
I (C
x
-
C
2 )
E
C
11.27 14.38 16.00* 13.88
E
i
10.27 9.62 11.78 10.55
E
2
21.16 21.31 18.46 20.29
n (C
2 -
T00) EC 9.73 13.85 13
. 19** 12.26
E
1
8.62 7.96 10.27 8.95
E
2
21.19 20.96 16.50* 19.55
III (Factorial) E
c
11.38 14.08 13 . 83* 13.10
E
1
11.62 10.00 12.79 11.47
E
2
20.42 17.35 14.50*** 17.42
* ^ 4 .05 that preceding means within a row are significantly
different.
** 2 < .025 that preceding means within a row are significantly
different.
*** p ^ .001 that preceding means within a row are
significantly
different.
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TABLE B
Kean Error-Uncertainty for Each Training Condition
. Groups Factorial Groups
Mean
Error-Uncertainty
Kean
Group Error-Uncertainty
14.87 T00 12.22
14.95 T01 13.87
T
10
16.20
TL
ll
13.69
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TABLE C
Mean Error-Uncertainty for Each W x N x E Cell
Analysis III
Warning Level of
Empiricism
Training
T
10 Tn
W+ E
c
14.59 13.95
E
1 14.54 11.08
E
2 19.46 16.05*
T00
T
01
W- E
C 10.90 12.95
E
1 7.87 12.38*
E
2 17.90 16.28
* 2 .05 that means within the row are significantly
different
from each other, Newman-Kuels procedure.
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APPENDIX XIX
Simple Effects on E x B Interactions of Each Analysis
for Error and Error-Uncertainty Data
Analysis Comparison
Error
P df
Error-Uncertainty
F df
I B @ E
c
4.613 2,50** 3.681 2,50*
B © E
1 • 544 2,50 .800 2,50
B © E
2
2.012 2,50 1.540 2,50
II B @ E 3.571 2 j 50* 4,061 2,50**
B @ E
1
.490 2,50 • 00 o~>0 2,50
B © E
2
3.829 2
,
50* 3.941 2,50*
III B © E
q
4.831 2 , 102** 3.839 2,102*
B © E^ 1.425 2,102 2.692 2,102
B @ E
2
11.011 2,102*** 11.538 2,102*<
*
**
***
d .05
£ ^ .025
£ <. .001

